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Much of the risk perception literature relies on the important but unstated
assumption that manipulating public opinion to conform to scientific
assessments of risk could help the public and, in turn, policymakers make better
decisions about whether and how to regulate.' This Article argues that the
assumption fails in the context of certain "multilayered" risks, or risks that
pose tiered policy choices, for which the question is not just whether to
regulate, but how to respond to derivative risks arising from the first set of
regulatory changes. Examining the debate about the role of nuclear power in
the United States' response to climate change, the Article observes that first-
and second-tier risks often differ in character, or require different types of
regulatory solutions (market-based versus command-and-control). Due to these
variations, the public may hold starkly different views about regulation of each
tier, and those views may be differently "sticky "-that is, differently susceptible
to persuasion.
In the context of the nuclear power debate, this tiering of opinion has
perverse implications. The first-tier risks of nuclear power are those associated
with individual reactors, including the risks of accident or terrorist attack; the
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second-tier risks are those associated with mining, transport, processing,
storage, and disposal of radioactive materials. Recent work asserts that despite
entrenched public fear of nuclear power, it may be possible to induce people to
support construction of low-emissions reactors as a strategy for mitigating
climate change. But even if policymakers could employ the risk education
strategies discussed in the literature to shift public opinion in favor of nuclear
reactor development, there is no reason to think such strategies would be
equally effective at changing attitudes toward the second-tier risks of
radioactive materials and the command-and-control regulations necessary to
address those risks. To the contrary, many people would likely continue to
oppose certain types of government action on these derivative problems, even
assuming complete success of the hypothetical first-tier education strategy and
resulting support for expansion of nuclear facilities. As a result, the United
States could find itself with a thriving nuclear power sector, but without the
political will to address the grave collateral risks.
These observations lead to two conclusions, one related to the nuclear
power example, and one to risk regulation more broadly. First, differently
sticky public attitudes toward first- and second-tier nuclear risks and their
regulatory solutions may defeat any effort to respond to climate change via an
increase in U.S. reliance on nuclear power. Second, efforts to change public
risk perceptions may not advance a regulatory agenda, and may even prove
counterproductive. Specifically, where multiple risk layers exist, a successful
first-tier education effort and consequent policy changes could create or expose
second-tier risks that defy regulatory solution, leaving policymakers stranded
at the abrupt and unexpected end of a half-built bridge. Depending on the
gravity of the second-tier risks, this regulatory dead end could be one that
neither policymakers nor the public would have chosen beforehand
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INTRODUCTION
In the last few decades, social scientists and behavioral economists have
made considerable progress in understanding how ordinary people perceive
environmental and health risks, and why their perceptions differ from expert
assessments. 2 To date, much of the research has focused on how biases and
mental rules of thumb (or "heuristics") influence lay perception of risk. For
example, studies suggest that people underestimate risks they assume
voluntarily, 3 and risks associated with beneficial activities. 4 In contrast, they
overestimate risks imposed involuntarily, 5 and risks associated with activities
of which they normatively disapprove. 6 Also, unsurprisingly, people fear risks
associated with vividly documented catastrophes far more than equally
significant risks that have not recently made the front pages.
7
Most scholars now agree about the effects of these biases and heuristics, 8
but there is ongoing debate over whether such mental shortcuts are best
understood as limits-"bounds"--on individuals' capacity to reason,9 or
2. See generally Ann Bostrom, Risk Perceptions: "Experts " vs. "Lay People ", 8 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y F. 101 (1997) (discussing "discrepancies between expert assessments and lay perceptions of
risk"); U.S. EPA, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS (1987) (noting the discrepancy between expert and lay assessments of the risk of indoor
radon).
3. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Howard Kunreuther & Gilbert F. White, Decision Processes,
Rationality and Adjustment to Natural Hazards, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 26, 26 (Paul Slovic ed.,
2000) ("the public seems willing to accept voluntary risks roughly 1000 times greater than involuntary
risks at a given level of benefit"); Lisa Heinzerling, Political Science, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 449, 470-72
(1995) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (1993)).
4. See, e.g., Melissa L. Finucane, Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic, & Stephen M. Johnson, The Affect
Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 3, 413, 415-16;
see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1137 (2002) (reviewing THE
PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 3).
5. See, e.g., Slovic et al., supra note 3; Heinzerling, supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1119 (2006)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Misfearing].
7. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 36-39 (2005)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR].
8. An alternative view presumes that people assess risks more rationally, by weighing costs and
benefits. See W. KIP VISCUSI, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE
37(1983).
9. See Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 6, at 1111-12 ("People should be regarded as boundedly
rational weighers.").
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instead as reflections of their cultural identities. 10 The former view, termed
"bounded rationality," conceives of individuals as rational evaluators of risk
whose estimations are skewed by perceptual and cognitive biases, but not (in
the first instance, at least) by their cultural predispositions." 1 They view the
world, if you will, through tinted glasses, rationally perceiving what they see,
but failing to notice the color alteration. In contrast, advocates of the "cultural
cognition" model assert that individuals' "worldviews," or political and cultural
belief systems, "permeate all of the mechanisms through which [they]
apprehend risk, including their emotional appraisals of putatively dangerous
activities, their comprehension and retention of empirical information, and their
disposition to trust competing sources of risk information." 12 According to this
model, two aspects of worldview primarily influence lay perception of risk: the
extent to which a person is hierarchical, or inclined to defer to the judgment of
government leaders, and the extent to which he or she prioritizes individual
rather than collective goals.
Armed with this basic (if still disputed) understanding of the cognitive
shortcuts and cultural predispositions that drive public attitudes about risk,
policymakers are now positioned to address a more forward-looking set of
questions, all of which fall under a single broad heading: should government
respond to arguably misplaced public fear, and if so, how? For example, should
policymakers "respond to public concerns, simply because they are public
concerns," (the "populist" view) or, at the opposite extreme, should
government regulate only those hazards that have a significant actual likelihood
of causing serious-or at least expensive-harm to public health or welfare
(the "technocratic" view). 13 Or is there a middle ground? Can regulators devise
strategies to bring the public's perceptions closer in line with the experts'
calculations, and then regulate whatever risks the public continues to fear?
Many authors advocate this last approach, suggesting broad and largely
one-size-fits-all strategies for reshaping lay perceptions of risk. 14 This Article
contends, however, that taking the important step from theories that identify
and characterize risk perception biases to prescriptions for public education
strategies and regulatory responses requires a deep and nuanced understanding
of the specific risks at issue. Failure to hone the education and regulatory
prescription to the particular risk at issue could produce unexpected outcomes
with costs that outweigh any anticipated benefit.
10. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy, supra note 1, at 1072 (reviewing SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR,
supra note 7, and arguing that the book ignores "one of the most important recent advances in the
science of risk perception" -the way that "cultural worldviews permeate all of the mechanisms through
which individuals apprehend risk").
11. Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 6, at 1111.
12. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy, supra note 1, at 1072.
13. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 7, at 126.
14. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 168-69 (2006) [hereinafter Kahan & Braman, Cultural Cognition] (discussing
MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982), and other work by Douglas).
[Vol. 35:31
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To make this point, this Article considers the potential outcomes of using
public education strategies informed by cognitive psychology to address a high-
profile contemporary issuel 5-whether the United States should promote
nuclear power as a substantial part of the country's response to climate change.
There is sharp debate about the advisability of this approach to climate change
mitigation. Nuclear industry proponents claim that, in light of increasing
scientific certainty that climate change poses a real and substantial threat to
human health and welfare, the United States should promote rapid and
significant growth of the nuclear sector. They point out that nuclear plants do
not bum fuel and therefore emit no combustion byproducts like carbon dioxide,
the greenhouse gas most responsible for climate change. 16 Indeed, even if one
takes into account the greenhouse gas emissions associated with uranium
mining, transport, processing, storage, and disposal, most analysts agree that
nuclear energy has advantages over traditional energy sources like coal and
natural gas, and is environmentally competitive with alternatives like wind
power. 17 Industry opponents, on the other hand, argue that nuclear facilities are
not cost-effective, and that the dangers of nuclear power-including safety
risks, proliferation risks, and radioactive waste generation--outweigh any
putative climate change benefits.18
This much of the debate has been widely reported, but one further point
bears emphasis here. As discussed in Part II below, scientists who have
evaluated the so-called "nuclear option" have concluded that making nuclear
power a nonnegligible part of our climate change strategy would require
15. See, e.g., Nuclear Power: The Shape of Things to Come, ECONOMIST, July 9, 2005, at Special
Report 2; Stephen L. Teichler & Charles W. Whitney, Nuclear Power is Coming Back to Life: While
Obstacles Remain, the Industry Sees a Brighter Future, LEGAL TIMES, June 12, 2006, at 28; Mike
Stuckey, New nuclear power 'wave '-or just a ripple?, MSNBC, Jan. 23, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/1 6272910/.
16. See, e.g., John Tierney, No Nukes, No More, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at Al; G. Pascal
Zachary, The Case For Nuclear Power: Economists, Environmentalists And Energy Consumers Find
Incentives To Start Building New Plants, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 5, 2006, at El; IAE: Build more nuclear
power plants, MARKETPLACE, Nov. 7, 2006, http://marketplace.publicradio.org/shows/2006/
I 1/07/PM200611074.html; Peter Schwartz & Spencer Reiss, Nuclear Now! How Clean, Green Atomic
Energy Can Stop Global Warming, WIRED, Feb. 2005, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.02/
nuclear.html.
17. Institute for Energy & Environmental Research, Summary, Insurmountable Risks 2 (2006),
http://www.ieer.org/reports/insurmountablerisks/summary.pdf (summarizing BRICE SMITH,
INSURMOUNTABLE RISKS: THE DANGER OF USING NUCLEAR POWER TO COMBAT GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE (2006): "Compared to the other major energy sources used around the world to generate base
load electricity ... nuclear power plants emit far lower levels of greenhouse gases even when mining,
enrichment, and fuel fabrication are taken into consideration."); see also John L.R. Proops, Philip W.
Gay, Stefan Speck & Thomas Schr6der, The Lifetime Pollution Implications Of Various Types Of
Electricity Generation. An Input-Output Analysis, 24 ENERGY POL'Y 229, 236 (1996).
18. See, e.g., HELEN CALDICOTr, NUCLEAR POWER Is NOT THE ANSWER (2006); Thomas B.
Cochran, Christopher E. Paine, Geoffrey Fettus & Robert S. Norris, Position Paper: Commercial
Nuclear Power (Oct. 2005), http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/power/power.pdf; Institute for Energy &
Environmental Research, supra note 17, at 4-21 (discussing nuclear power's economic and safety and
environmental costs).
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construction of about ten large U.S. nuclear facilities every year, and a
corresponding expansion of uranium exploration, mining, transport, processing,
storage, and disposal operations. Thus, the policy question we currently face-
and the only question this Article considers-is not whether individual power
companies could or should build an additional nuclear power plant or two, 19
but whether the country should amend its regulatory regimes to promote
historically unprecedented expansion of the sector as a response to climate
change.
In the current political environment, a large-scale national commitment to
nuclear power would be virtually impossible.20 Thus, the immediate subsidiary
question is whether policymakers could increase public acceptance of nuclear
energy by educating people about the risks of climate change and nuclear
power's greenhouse gas advantages compared to traditional energy sources,2 1
and if so, whether attempting to influence public opinion is advisable.
To investigate this question, the Article considers two alternative risk
education strategies, one that aims to overcome identified "bounds" on lay
people's assessments of risk, and another designed to take into account and
reconcile divergent cultural worldviews. Both strategies have the same
hypothetical goal: to convince the public that the risks of nuclear power are
preferable to (or less significant than) those of climate change, and therefore
that the United States should embrace regulatory changes that streamline
development of new nuclear facilities to meet our ever-growing energy needs. 22
19. That is, the sweeping policy choice is not whether, for individual companies, the marginal
benefits of constructing one, two, or ten new nuclear plants over the next few decades exceed the
marginal costs of that approach, but whether we should, as a nation, turn to nuclear power as a
significant part of our climate strategy-and make the regulatory changes that such a sweeping shift in
energy policy would entail. Although the discussion in this Article has implications for the former
choice, the Article itself is directed only at the latter.
20. See, e.g., DAVID REINER ET AL., AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF PUBLIC ATITITUDES
TOWARDS CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES 6 (2006), available at
http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/GHGT8_Reiner.pdf (citing poll results that suggest far less than half of
the U.S. public thinks nuclear power should be "use[d] to address global warming"); Eugene A. Rosa,
Public Acceptance of Nuclear Power: Ddj vu All Over Again?, PHYSICS & SOC'Y (American Physical
Soc'y/Forum on Physics & Soc'y, College Park, Md.), Apr. 2001, at 20, http://units.aps.org/
units/fps/newsletters/2001/april/aptoc.pdf (discussing poll results from 1999) ("Past accidents,
misrepresentations by the nuclear industry ... and a growing mistrust of many institutions, especially
institutions associated with nuclear power, such as the DOE, have made the public apprehensive about
the technology. And all signs indicate that this apprehension runs deep. On the other hand, Americans
support the idea of leaving the nuclear option open, perhaps as a trump card against future energy
shortages or as the only demonstrated energy alternative for dealing with global warming. In summary,
while the public may support this technology in the future; there is little basis to say that the future is
now.").
21. The relatively new suggestion of "debiasing through law" offers another potential approach,
see generally Christine Jolls, Behavioral Lav and Economics (Yale Law School, Public Law Working
Paper No. 130, 2006), http://ssm.com/abstract-959177 (summarizing the approach), though it is not
immediately obvious how one could employ such a strategy in the specific context of nuclear power.
22. Importantly, this Article does not advocate nuclear power and avoids taking a position on the
actual sizes of the nuclear and climate change risks because this hypothetical exercise has important
implications whatever one's views about the relative safety of nuclear technology.
[Vol. 35:31
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Would an education campaign based on either a bounded rationality or
cultural cognition model succeed? The risk perception literature suggests two
possible answers to this question, neither of which is encouraging for
proponents of nuclear sector expansion.
First, the education strategies might simply fail. As discussed below,
nuclear power generation embodies many of the traits that engender an
instinctive or affective negative response. As a result, subjects of an education
campaign aimed at overcoming cognitive bounds on risk perception might hold
tight to their instinctive fears of nuclear technology in spite of their increased
analytical understanding of the consequences of a warming planet. Similarly,
any attempt to find a policy middle ground that appeals to people of divergent
worldviews might also fail, because the same cultural worldviews that
(according to the model) predispose one to fear climate change also predispose
one to fear nuclear power, while the technologically optimistic views that
predispose one to dismiss the dangers of nuclear energy also predispose one to
question the seriousness of the climate risk.2 3 Therefore, rather than
overcoming cultural predispositions that influence lay perceptions of the two
risks, any effort to build a coalition across worldviews could instead drive
opposing groups to their respective comers.
This first outcome--outright failure--conveys a simple lesson: in deciding
what to do about risks that the public fears (perhaps irrationally), regulators
must consider whether those fears are amenable to persuasion. For risks that
trigger few of our innate or cultural biases, the most democratic and cost-
effective approach may be to design education strategies to bring public
perceptions in line with expert opinion, and then to regulate only as much as
the experts advise. For risks that trigger many biases, however, there is reason
to suppose any such education effort would fail, leaving regulators to confront
the difficult question posed above-how and how much to regulate in the face
of contrary public opinion. 24
23. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
24. This Article does not attempt to answer this question. In particular, it avoids entering the
debate among those who advocate strict adherence to experts' assessments of which risks are "real," see,
e.g., STEVEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 55 (1993) ("1 assume a kind of 'general
will'-a public that 'really' wants an overall result" (greater risk reduction at present cost or equal risk
reduction at lower cost) "that differs from its substance-specific preferences revealed on particular
occasions"), those who acknowledge that even misplaced public fears may exact a cost sufficient to
justify regulation, see, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 135-36 (2004); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability
Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 103-04 (2002), and those who would give
great weight to the many value judgments implicit in public perceptions of risk, see, e.g., ACKERMAN &
HEINZERLING, supra, at 136, 151 ("When people worry about risks that are unfamiliar, unknown, and
potentially catastrophic, they are expressing, in part, a distaste for a special kind of uncertainty: one in
which the worst-case harmful potential of a hazard is unknown and unlimited .... The context of risk,
the fairness of burdens and benefits-all these characteristics, which are all-important in real decisions,
are priceless. They cannot be forgotten in making effective public policy, but they cannot be
remembered with a number."); Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying the
Risk-assessment Battlefield, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 3, at 390, 392 [hereinafter Slovic,
2008)
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The more interesting possible outcome of the hypothetical nuclear power
education strategies is not failure, but partial success. Subjects could learn to
accept some first-tier nuclear power regulations, for example regulations that
promote development of new reactors at existing facilities, or regulations that
provide tax incentives and liability coverage for development of altogether new
facilities.25 These first-tier regulations would allow the nuclear sector to grow,
but would simultaneously augment derivative risks like safety, proliferation,
and radioactive waste. Each of these derivative risks would then require its own
regulatory solutions, such as stricter guidelines for terrorism-resistant plant
construction, or streamlined procedures for siting and licensing of waste
facilities.
Individuals who support the first-tier market-stimulus regulations might
feel differently about these equally necessary second-tier command-and-control
regulations. This shift in attitude could result in two ways. First, people who
came to see the advantages of nuclear power could prove to have stickier views
toward secondary issues like radioactive waste storage and disposal. Whether
one subscribes to the bounded rationality or cultural cognition school of risk
perception, there is no a priori reason to assume that on learning to accept new
nuclear power facilities, the public would also inevitably surrender its fear of
and opposition to new waste facilities. The public's stickier attitudes toward
waste issues could well have a perverse effect. Public fear of waste facilities
could engender strong opposition to waste facility siting and development and,
ultimately, a less satisfactory public response to the waste problem than to the
first-order issues related to new power facility construction and operation.
The second possible shift in public attitudes would result only under the
cultural cognition model. Proponents of that model argue that one way to
overcome public biases is to devise policies that have "cross-cultural" appeal-
that is, policies that will garner the support of a coalition of people of diverse
cultural worldviews. 26 Again, however, the same coalition may not support
both market-based regulations to stimulate the nuclear industry and command-
and-control regulations to ensure safe handling and disposal of radioactive
materials. In fact, as discussed below, any coalition that supports the former
would likely prove unstable when confronted with the latter. Again, the results
could well be perverse. The coalition that supports market-based nuclear power
incentives could break down when confronted with proposals for top-down
regulatory mandates governing plant operation, radioactive material handling,
and waste storage and disposal, thereby allowing new plants to come online
well before any programs are in place to address their second-tier effects.
Trust, Emotion, Sex] ("[M]any of the public's reactions to risk... can be attributed to a sensitivity to the
technical, social and psychological qualities of hazards that are not well-modeled in technical risk
assessments.");
25. See Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy, supra note 1, at 1097 (suggesting that market solutions
soften some cultural cognition barriers to recognition and regulation of environmental problems).
26. Kahan & Braman, Cultural Cognition, supra note 14.
[Vol. 35:31
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The likely consequences of risk education strategies based on the bounded
rationality and cultural cognition theories indicate two broad conclusions. First,
pragmatically, an honest appraisal of the immense financial and regulatory
investment that would be necessary to make nuclear power a significant and
safe part of the United States' climate change strategy suggests that we cannot
get there from here. Either the entrenched public fear of nuclear power will
prove resistant to even the best education strategies, or worse, those strategies
will engender support for only the first round of necessary regulatory reforms,
not the entire suite of reforms necessary to ensure safe growth of the sector.
Thus, absent an unusual willingness on the part of political leaders to buck
public will, these scenarios suggest that the nuclear industry will either remain
moribund, or thrive but evade comprehensive regulation.
Second, for multilayered risks like nuclear power, one potential cost of
any initial regulatory effort is the development or augmentation of derivative
risks that require their own round of regulation. The public may prove to have
stickier attitudes toward these derivative risks than toward the principal risks,
undercutting the effectiveness of the initial risk education strategy.
Alternatively, the derivative risks may require different forms of regulatory
solutions, thereby destabilizing the (loose) coalition that supported the first
round of regulation. 27
The remainder of this Article puts flesh on these bones. Part II outlines the
principal approaches to risk perception discussed in the literature. Part III
introduces the nuclear power debate and explores the potential outcomes of
hypothetical risk education strategies based on the bounded rationality and
cultural cognition models. Finally, Part IV extrapolates from this exercise to the
broader problem of public attitudes toward layered risks.
I. MODELS OF PUBLIC RISK PERCEPTION
A. Background
Every day, we confront serious risks and make behavioral or policy
choices that affect the magnitude of those risks. On both the individual and
public policy levels, some of those choices are easier to make than others.
Individual drivers, for example, readily choose to obey (most) red lights,
thereby reducing the probability of serious accidents. And policymakers readily
27. Indeed, Madison all but predicted this latter dynamic in Federalist 10, when he advocated a
large republic as a means of limiting the power of unruly factions. "To state the Madisonian proposition
... broadly, the danger of a stable coalition increases as the size of the political unit decreases because
the areas of disagreement become fewer and the divisions in the population consequently become more
fundamental and permanent." Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1597
(1965). This insight, salutary in the context of factional rebellion, poses a thorny problem for sensible,
stepwise regulation of multilayered risks facing large polities.
2008]
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choose to require manhole covers, thereby reducing the probability of fatal
falls.
But what of the harder choices-those that require significant individual
or public expenditures, and those that involve risk tradeoffs? Many individuals
may have a harder time deciding whether it is "worth it" to sell their old car and
purchase a new one that meets the latest safety standards, or to get a vaccine
that provides some long-term protection but poses a risk of immediate infection
or other side effects. And policymakers, too, may be uncertain whether to
require incorporation of an expensive safety device in new cars, or to require
that all schoolchildren receive a particular live-culture vaccine.
Since the 1970s, these and related questions have stimulated lively debates
about whether and when government should regulate risks. Much of the
discussion has addressed questions of scientific, economic, and political
philosophy: When is it scientifically and economically "worthwhile" to
regulate a risk? And what balance should regulators strike between public
safety and individual liberty? Not surprisingly, perspectives on these issues
vary widely. Along the economic to scientific philosophy spectrum, the views
range from those who believe that government activities should be strictly cost-
justified 28 to those who question the use of any form of cost-benefit analysis, 2 9
advocating instead a general "precautionary principle." 30 The political
philosophy spectrum, on the other hand, extends from those who would limit
government intervention31 to those who champion a strong, even paternalistic
role for regulators. 32
In the last few decades, advances in behavioral psychology have
complicated matters by identifying a third issue for debate. Theorists exploring
the cognitive shortcuts and cultural predispositions that influence public
perceptions of risk have observed that policymakers must decide whether to
adopt a "populist" approach and "respond to public concerns, simply because
they are public concerns," 33 or, at the opposite extreme, take a "technocratic"
28. E.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Monetizing the Benefits of Risk and Environmental Regulation, 33
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 1003, 1004-05 (2006) ("Because no risk or environmental benefit warrants an
infinite expenditure, the practical policy issue is what level of monetary cost is justified to obtain the
benefit.").
29. E.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 24, at 9 ("To say that life, health, and nature are
priceless is not to say that we should spend an infinite amount of money to protect them. Rather, it is to
say that translating life, health, and nature into dollars is not a fruitful way of deciding how much
protection to give them. A different way of thinking and deciding about them is required.").
30. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 7, at 15-18 (summarizing the history of the
principle and discussing its "widespread international support").
31. E.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Constructive Cigarette Regulation, 47 DuKE L.J. 1095, 1101-02 (1998)
("The mere existence of a large risk, however, is not a legitimate rationale for government regulation...
In a world of rational choice, with full information, there would be no rationale ... for interfering with
[individual] decisions.").
32. E.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1541 (1996) (describing how bounded rationality may shape a
"skepticism about antipatemalism," though not offering "an affirmative defense of paternalism").
33. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 7, at 126.
[Vol. 35:31
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approach, and ignore public sentiment, responding to fear only "if and to the
extent that it is anchored in reality." 34
This Article explores the possible consequences of taking an intermediate
approach, using advances in behavioral psychology to design public education
strategies that influence lay perception of risk.3 5 In particular, the Article
considers the implications for such an education strategy of situations in which
the at-risk public responds differently to principle and derivative layers of a
multilayered risk.
B. Why Lay and Expert Opinions Differ
1. Overview
Lay people and experts differ markedly in their estimation of both
everyday and less familiar risks.36 The attempt to explain these results began
over three decades ago, when psychologists studying gambling preferences
began to apply their findings to human risk perception.37 In the intervening
years, numerous studies have confirmed that public perception of risk is
influenced by certain perceptual and analytic biases and mental rules of thumb,
or heuristics.
For example, the "affect heuristic" describes the instinctive, or affective,
reaction that leads people to underestimate the risks of beneficial activities
(activities with which they have positive associations) 3 8 and overestimate risks
34. Id.
35. It is worth noting, however, that having populist or technocratic leanings does not determine
one's views on the scientific, economic and political issues that complicate risk regulation. A technocrat
who firmly believes that government should respond only to "real" risks must still decide which type
and level of response are scientifically and economically justified, and which are politically so. Thus,
even if we could "mak[e] public opinion conform to the best available scientific information on risk,"
Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy, supra note 1, at 1072, numerous hard questions would remain.
36. BREYER, supra note 24, at 33; see also WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE WORLD
HEALTH REPORT 2002: REDUCING RISKS, PROMOTING HEALTHY LIFE 31 (2006), available at
http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/whr02 en.pdf ("By the early 1990s, particularly in North America and
Europe, it became apparent that.. . risk had different meanings to different groups of people and that all
risks had to be understood within the larger social, cultural and economic context .... In addition it
became apparent that public perceptions of risks to health did not necessarily agree with those of the
scientists, whose authority was increasingly being questioned by both the general public and politicians.
Although there was considerable agreement between the public and scientists on many risk assessments,
there were also some, such as nuclear power and pesticides, where there were large differences of
opinion .... These differences of perception often led to intense public controversy.... By the mid-
1990s ... [it was] generally accepted that differences in perceptions of risk had to be understood and
resolved.").
37. THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 3, at xxi.
38. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Rational Actors and Rational Fools: The Influence of Affect on
Judgment and Decision-Making, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163, 180 (2000) [hereinafter Slovic,
Rational Actors]; Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, E. Peters, & D.G. MacGregor, The Affect Heuristic,
in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002).
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imposed involuntarily.39 The affect heuristic may help to explain why people
tend to overestimate the magnitude of "dread" risks.40 A particularly dread risk
(that is, an uncontrollable risk, imposed involuntarily, with lethal consequences
that are unfairly distributed across society) inspires strongly negative feelings
that, in turn, lead individuals to assess the level of the risk as high.
4 1
In a related phenomenon, many people overestimate the risks of activities
of which they disapprove ("normative bias" 42). Thus, those who vehemently
oppose abortion may be more likely to believe the procedure poses dangers for
pregnant women, while those who support abortion rights may discount any
such evidence as the product of junk science. 43
By contrast, the "availability heuristic" 44 has less to do with the
characteristics of a risk than with how recently and in what manner it has been
reported in the news. If people are able to call a specific incidence of a risk to
mind, they tend to assume the risk itself is high.4 5 If the remembered incidence
was catastrophic, the effect is even more pronounced. 4 6 A 2006 food-borne E.
coli scare47 provides a good example. In its immediate aftermath, people were
more likely to worry about eating fresh vegetables from the store than about the
risk of driving to the store in the first place.
Social interactions reinforce the availability heuristic. As people tell
stories about disasters, they often transmit not only objective information about
the event but their own subjective fear. Thus, fears of "available" risks often
prove contagious (the "cascade effect" 48). Additionally, groups of like-minded
people tend to sharpen and confirm each other's views about such risks, leading
to "group polarization."49 Finally, the cascade effect and group polarization
have a predictable effect in the workplace, where employees' views about risk
39. See, e.g., Slovic, Kureuther & White, supra note 3; Heinzerling, supra note 3.
40. Paul Slovic, What's Fear Got to Do with It? It's Affect We Need to Worry About, 69 Mo. L.
REV. 971, 976 (2004) [hereinafter Slovic, What's Fear Got to Do with It?]; see also, e.g., Finucane,
supra note 4, at 415-16; Sunstein, supra note 4, at 1137. The affect heuristic helps to explain why "food
additives, for example, tend to be seen as very high in risk and relatively low in benefit, whereas...
antibiotics and x-rays tend to be seen as high in benefit and relatively low in risk." Slovic, Rational
Actors, supra note 38, at 180.
41. Slovic, What's Fear Got to Do with It?, supra note 40, at 976.
42. Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 6, at 1119.
43. Id. at 1118.
44. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 7, at 36-39.
45. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969, 981
(2006).
46. See, e.g., Paula E. Berg, When the Hazard is Human: Irrationality, Inequity, and Unintended
Consequences in Federal Regulation of Contagion, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1367, 1403-04 (1997) ("Studies
of risk perception demonstrate that the media's tendency to focus on sensational, unusual, and
catastrophic risks leads the public to overestimate the occurrence of these hazards.").
47. See, e.g., Marian Burros, E. Coli Fears Inspire a Call for Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2006,
at BI.
48. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 7, at 94-98.
49. Id. at 98-102.
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often come to resemble those of their employer institutions ("affiliation
bias" 50).
2. The Bounded Rationality Model
Some theorists find these and similar biases and heuristics sufficient to
explain most of what is observed about the selectivity-and occasional
irrationality-of public fears. Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, identifies
five factors that he deems "especially pertinent" to understanding differences in
risk perception: 5 1 (1) the availability heuristic; (2) "probability neglect," which
refers to the human tendency to worry about worst-case scenarios, no matter
how improbable; (3) loss aversion, which leads people to disfavor a potential
loss more than they favor an equal and opposite potential gain; 52 (4)
widespread belief in the benevolence of nature; and (5) "system neglect," or the
tendency to focus on the effects of a risk to the exclusion of other important
regulatory considerations, like the direct costs of government intervention and
the potential risk tradeoffs that might result from such intervention.
5 3
Professor Sunstein contends that observed correlations between people's
cultural framework and their perceptions of risk result from these and other
bounds on rationality. These bounds (in particular the cascade effect and
normative bias) lead individuals of similar cultural backgrounds to reach
similar conclusions about risks. 54 According to this model, therefore, any
cultural differences in risk perceptions are not the cause but the effect of
perceptual shortcuts and biases.
Explaining this concept further, Sunstein divides the universe of risks into
two categories: those that raise few political concerns (the risk of falling asleep
at the wheel, or suffering a heart attack during exercise) and "hot risks," which
are associated with culturally divisive issues (for example, risks associated with
abortion or gun ownership). 55 To evaluate the former type of risk, he claims,
individuals coolly assess the evidence, within the bounds of culturally-
independent analytic shortcuts. For hot risks, on the other hand, heuristics and
50. Nancy Kraus, Torbjorn Malmfors & Paul Slovic, Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay
Judgments of Chemical Risks, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 3, at 285, 311-313. Kraus and
her co-authors observe, for example, that "[t]oxicologists working for industry see chemicals as more
benign than do their counterparts in academia and government." Id. at 311. This observation does not, of
course, answer the causation question. Contrary to the assumption in the text, it may be that individuals
who are predisposed to fear chemicals choose to work for academic or governmental employers, and
those who dismiss such fears find the chemical industry a more welcoming work environment. Once
such affiliations are created, however, one would expect the cascade effect and group polarization to
solidify them.
51. See SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 7, at 35-37.
52. For example, people charge more to relinquish a good they already have than they are willing
to pay to acquire the same good in the first place. Id. at 41-43.
53. Id. at 35.
54. Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 6, at 1118.
55. id. at 1115.
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biases like the cascade effect, group polarization, and normative bias56 tend to
bolster existing social or political divisions, leading people to favor the views
held by others in their self-identified cohort.
Assuming this bounded rationality model explains much of what is
observed about human risk perception, how might public education strategies
be designed to foster support for a desired regulatory program?57 Risk
perception theorists and behavioral psychologists suggest various tactics for
overcoming bounds on risk assessment.
First, any education strategy must address strict inaccuracies in public
perceptions. To this end, Professor Paul Slovic emphasizes the importance of
public trust in the individual who provides the risk information. In turn, the
information provider must be sufficiently expert to understand and assess the
validity of risk estimates and convey them sensitively to a potentially fearful
public. 58
The accessibility of risk education is also important. For example, people
tend to understand comparisons better than numbers or probabilities, especially
when the latter are small. 59 Thus, to educate someone about the risk of death
from riding a motorcycle, it is less useful to present the absolute motorcycle
fatality rate (2000 fatalities per year per 100,000 persons at risk) than to
compare that rate to the risk of dying from smoking (300/100,000 fatalities per
year), the risk of dying from a motor vehicle accident (24/100,000 fatalities per
year), and the risk of being killed by lightning (0.05/100,000 fatalities per
year). 60
Another accessibility consideration stems from the recognition in the
psychology literature that people tend to understand frequencies better than
probabilities. For example, consider the following ways of presenting
information about the reliability of a medical test: (1) "[A] test to detect a
disease whose prevalence is [one in a thousand] has a false positive rate of
[5%]," versus (2) "One out of a thousand Americans has a disease; fifty out of a
thousand healthy people test positive." 61 In both examples, the probability that
a person who tests positive actually has the disease is about one in fifty. But
people understand that fact much more intuitively when presented with the
second frequency-based statement.
A risk education campaign, however, will not easily shift perception of
some risks, because some of the difference between lay and expert risk
56. See SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 7 at 89-104.
57. For the moment, this analysis begs normative questions about the wisdom and morality of
such a deliberate "reeducation" campaign. The conclusion of the Article, however, begins to answer the
former question.
58. Paul Slovic, Informing and Educating the Public about Risk, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK,
supra note 3, at 182, 183 [hereinafter Slovic, Informing and Educating]; accord Slovic, Trust, Emotion,
Sex, supra note 24, at 392.
59. Slovic, Informing and Educating, supra note 58, at 187.
60. Id.
61. See STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 344, 348 (1997).
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assessments stems not from analytic mistakes but from biases that lead people
to fear certain kinds of risk more than other, comparably sized risks, depending
on affective factors like "uncertainty, controllability, catastrophic potential,
equity and threat to future generations." 62 Thus, an education effort that simply
compares, say, the risk of living near a nuclear power plant to that of driving a
car will not resonate with the public, as it "fails to give adequate consideration
to... important differences in the nature" of these hazards-differences that do
resonate. 6 3 In short, changing the public's risk perception requires a "two-way
process" in which "[e]ach side, expert and public,... respect[s] the insights and
intelligence of the other."
64
Recognizing this fact, producer and journalism professor Jon Palfreman
argues that "journalists should expand their narrative horizons: to include not
just the facts about the risk in question but also how people feel about the risk
and why. In essence, they should report two dimensions of the risk story-the
physical narrative.., and the psychological subtext. ' 65 In the specific context of
climate change, for example, Palfreman suggests that journalists might be
better able to interest the public in global climate change if they emphasize its
implications for future generations-"the 'legacy' concept" that proved
successful with nuclear power awareness. 66 "If we all have available an image
of our grandchildren struggling with irreversible climate change," he claims,
"the problem seems less abstract and more pressing.'" 6 7
This summary is incomplete but provides some sense of the necessary
ingredients of an education strategy that aims to overcome (or, more accurately,
account for) bounds on strictly rational risk assessment: trust in the educator,
accessible presentation of the facts, and framing that is sensitive to the specific
risk characteristics that underlie much public fear. In the discussion below,
references to a "bounded rationality campaign" to convince the public to accept
nuclear power as a solution to climate change refer to a hypothetical campaign
that perfectly incorporates these and other important insights about the biases
and heuristics that influence lay perceptions.
3. The Cultural Cognition Model
The cultural cognition model offers an alternative explanation for some of
the observed shortcomings in public risk perception, and it may therefore call
for an alternative (hypothetical) educational approach. Without rejecting
bounded rationality, the cultural cognition model argues that "worldviews
62. Paul Slovic, Informing and Educating, supra note 58, at 190.
63. Id. at 190-91.
64. Id.
65. Jon Palfreman, A Tale of Two Fears: Exploring Media Depictions of Nuclear Power and
Global Warming, 23 REV. POL'Y RES. 23, 38 (2006).
66. Id. at 38.
67. Id. at 38-39.
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permeate all of the mechanisms through which individuals apprehend risk,"-
including the biases and heuristics discussed above.68 Authors in this area
identify two possible worldview axes and assert that individuals "conform their
beliefs about risk" to their coordinates in this two-dimensional space-that is,
effectively, "to their visions of an ideal society.
69
As illustrated below, the two axes are "grid" (hierarchical to egalitarian)





According to this model, strict hierarchists distrust reports of
environmental risk, because they are inclined to believe government officials
are competent, 7 1 and they "perceive warnings of imminent environmental
catastrophe as threatening" that competence. 72 Strict individualists, too, reject
claims of environmental risk because they believe in the functioning of
unregulated markets. 73 Strict egalitarians and solidarists, on the other hand, are
predisposed to favor regulation of environmental risks, because such regulation
checks the commercial activities that produce social inequalities (anathema to
egalitarians) and legitimize greed (ditto to solidarists). 74
Can these cultural predispositions be overcome? Proponents of the cultural
cognition model believe so:
Nothing in our account implies either that there is no truth of the matter on
disputed empirical policy issues or that the public cannot be made receptive
to that truth. Like at least some other cognitive biases, cultural cognition
can be counteracted. . . . [F]actual disputes over gun control, the death
68. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy, supra note 1, at 1072.
69. Id.
70. Kahan & Braman, Cultural Cognition, supra note 14, at 153-54.
71. Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in
the Perception andAcceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 1427, 1430 (1996).
72. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy, supra note 1, at 1073-74.
73. Id. at 1084.
74. Kahan & Braman, Cultural Cognition, supra note 14, at 154.
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penalty, environmental regulation and like issues derive from individuals'
resistance to accepting information that threatens their cultural
commitments. It follows that individuals are likely to resist factual
information less if it can be presented in forms that affirm rather than
denigrate their values.75
Professors Dan Kahan and Donald Braman have discussed the practical
application of this "self-affirmation" strategy. They contend that affirming
cultural identities renders individuals "more open"-both attitudinally and
cognitively--"to reconsidering their beliefs on culturally contested issues."
76
Thus, policymakers seeking to overcome cultural biases on a particular issue
should "design[] policies that are sufficiently rich in their social meanings to
affirm the values of persons of diverse cultural worldviews simultaneously." 7 7
Two examples of this approach are directly relevant here. The first relates
to the development in the 1980s and 1990s of a tradable emissions permit
scheme for sulfur dioxide and other air pollutants.78 According to Kahan and
Braman, policymakers achieved political consensus around this new regime by
touting the permits as a market-based solution to air pollution, thereby (1)
"vindicat[ing] individualists' belief that private orderings conduce to societal
well-being"; (2) "affirm[ing]" hierarchists with "a policy that promised to
empower ... powerful commercial firms"; and (3) "recognizing" egalitarians'
and solidarists' "view[s] of the dangers of unconstrained commerce and
industry." 79 Overall, this approach made it easier for individualists and
hierarchists to recognize the problem of air pollution, and for egalitarians and
solidarists to recognize the inefficiencies of command-and-control regulation of
pollution." 8
0
The second relevant example concerns the nuclear power debate that is the
subject of this Article. The same authors suggest, briefly, that their affirmation
approach might work to convince the public to accept nuclear power as a solution
to climate change:
The self-affirmation effect suggests [that a proposal to renew investment in
nuclear power as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions] might actually
change minds, both about the dangers of global climate change and about
the risks of nuclear energy. Individualists and hierarchists both support
nuclear power, which is emblematic of the very cultural values that are
threatened by society's recognition of the global warming threat. Shown a
solution that affirms their identities, individualists and hierarchists ... can
be expected to display less resistance-not just politically, but
cognitively-to the proposition that global warming is a problem after all.
Likewise, when egalitarians and solidarists are exposed to the same
75. Id. at 168.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 169.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 169.
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information, they are likely to perceive nuclear power to be less dangerous:
The affirmation of their identity associated with the recognition of the
global warming threat lowers the cultural status cost of accepting
information about nuclear safety that they have long resisted.81
According to this view, then, the self-affirmation effect offers an approach
for policymakers who seek to shift public opinion about nuclear power.
References in the below discussion to a "cultural cognition campaign" refer to a
hypothetical realization of this approach.
II. RISK PERCEPTION AND THE NUCLEAR POWER DEBATE
Having outlined the two salient risk perception models, and each model's
suggested tactics for shaping public perceptions, this Article next considers
how we might expect these approaches to perform in practice. That is, in the
context of a particular policy debate, would a public education strategy based
on either the bounded rationality or cultural cognition model shift public
opinion in the desired direction? And if so, is such a shift likely to lead to an
objective improvement in public policy? Importantly, the latter two questions
are distinct. As the following discussion of the nuclear power debate illustrates,
an effective risk education campaign does not ensure equally effective public
policy.
This Part introduces the debate: What are the risks of climate change and
nuclear power? What would it mean for nuclear power to play a significant role
in a climate change strategy? And what regulatory changes would be required
to facilitate the necessary growth of the nuclear sector and to address any
attendant risks?
Turning to the public opinion piece of this puzzle, this Part then
hypothesizes a bounded rationality and a cultural cognition risk education
strategy, each aimed at convincing people to support nuclear power as an
approach to climate change, and asks (1) whether either strategy would be
successful, and (2) if so, what that success would "look like" in practice. The
results of this theoretical exercise are worrying, not just for nuclear enthusiasts,
but for anyone who hopes to use insights from behavioral psychology to move
public opinion in a useful direction.
A. The Nuclear Power Example
The increasing scientific certainty that global warming poses serious risks
to present and future generations has revived interest in nuclear power as a
"carbon-free" power source that could help satisfy the world's growing energy
needs without contributing significantly to the greenhouse effect.82 Even some
environmentalists, formerly opposed to nuclear technology, have revised their
81. Id.
82. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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views, arguing that we should explore nuclear energy as a supplement to
conservation and to renewable energy technologies like wind and solar
power. 83 Other longtime opponents, incensed by this softening of position,
remind the world in strident terms of the many unsolved problems nuclear
power poses-notably its upfront costs, attendant safety and proliferation risks,
and waste transport, storage, and disposal issues. 84
Given the stridency of this debate, one important and largely unaddressed
question is whether public opinion stands as an independent barrier to any
climate change strategy based predominantly or even significantly on safe
growth of the nuclear power sector. In other words, suppose policymakers
uniformly believed that nuclear power posed lesser risks than climate change,
and that we should shift a significant portion of U.S. energy production from
traditional fuels to nuclear as part of our effort to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. Could the public be persuaded to support this approach? And of
equal importance, what might be the consequences of an attempt to shift
attitudes in this wholesale way?
This Article makes no effort to plumb the depths of current thinking on
either climate change or nuclear power. It is sufficient for this discussion to
make a few brief points: (1) the fact of human-induced climate change is
increasingly certain, and current predictions suggest that the effects of the
warming-though difficult to predict and almost impossible to monetize-will
be massive and costly; (2) focusing strictly on greenhouse gas emissions,
nuclear power is "cleaner" than traditional power sources, but converting much
of the world's energy supply to nuclear is neither a complete solution to climate
83. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Old Foes Soften to New Reactors, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, at
Al (citing articles and statements by Stewart Brand, founder of the Whole Earth Catalog; Fred Krupp,
Executive Director of Environmental Defense; Jonathan Lash, President of the World Resources
Institute; and James Gustave Speth, Dean of the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies);
James Lovelock, Our Nuclear Lifeline: Go Nuclear? A Leading Environmentalist Says the Greens Are
Plain Wrong to Oppose It, READERS DIG., Mar. 2005, at 2; Patrick Moore, Going Nuclear: A Green
Makes the Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 2006, at B 1; Peter N. Spotts, Simpler-and Safer, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, June 2, 2005, at 13 ("[F]aced with global warming, some groups, such as the Pew Center
on Global Climate Change and Environmental Defense, appear willing to give nuclear energy a reluctant
second look."); Amanda Griscom Little, Green vs. Green: The Environmental Movement, Once
Staunchly Antinuclear, Is Facing Resistance From Within, WIRED, Feb. 2005, http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/I 3.02/nuclear.html?pg=5.
84. See, e.g., CALDICOTT, supra note 18; Press Release, U.S. Public Interest Research Group,
Nuclear Power Not Needed to Reduce Global Warming Emissions (May 25, 2005), available at
http://www.commondreams.org/news2005/0525-03.htm ("Nuclear power is the most dangerous and
expensive of all energy sources.... [N]one of the nuclear power industry's financial, security, safety,
waste, or proliferation problems has been solved."); Greenpeace USA, Nuclear Power's Extreme
Makeover, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/campaigns/nuclear/nuclear-power-s-extreme-makeov (last
visited Feb. 26, 2008); GREENPEACE USA, NUCLEAR ENERGY-No SOLUTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE
(2004), http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/usa/press-center/reports4/nuclear-energy-no-solution-
to.pdf ("The nuclear industry's disingenuous claims to a role in alleviating climate change must be
rejected for what they are: dangerous and self-serving fantasies which would create a serious legacy of
deadly radioactive waste, increase the risks of catastrophic nuclear accidents and also vastly increase the
threat of nuclear weapons proliferation.").
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change nor a necessary piece of the solution; (3) to play a nonnegligible role in
our climate change strategy, the nuclear power sector will have to grow
drastically; (4) stimulating the required growth of the nuclear power sector will
require regulatory action; and finally, (5) there are significant ancillary risks of
that growth, and addressing those risks, too, will require substantial regulatory
action.
1. Scientific Certainty About the Effects of Climate Change
Scientists have all but reached consensus about the seriousness of the risks
of global climate change. 85 The most oft-discussed such risk is a rise in sea
surface levels, 86 which will confront low-lying communities with a stark
choice: either invest in elaborate levee systems or risk inundation. There are
many other dangers, however, including increased storm intensity; increased
rainfall (in some areas); pervasive drought (in others); more frequent wildfires;
rapid loss of biodiversity, particularly in polar climes and in sensitive
ecosystems like coral reefs; expanded seasons and ranges for some noxious
species, including allergenic grasses and tropical disease agents; and even
significant changes in ocean circulation and, as a result, coastal climates. 87 The
costs to humans of these various changes in our natural environment are many
and varied, ranging from minor weather changes to disruption of our food and
water supplies, flooding and other natural disasters, and deadlier and more
frequent epidemics. 8 8 Moreover, these effects will hit hardest in the poorest
85. Elke U. Weber, Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of Long-Term Risk:
Why Global Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103 (2006); see also
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE
BASIS 4, 5, 8 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-spm.pdf
[hereinafter IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE] ("Warming of the climate system is unequivocal."); NICHOLAS
STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE vi (2006), available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/3/2/Summary of Conclusions.pdf [hereinafter STERN REVIEW] ("The scientific
evidence is now overwhelming: climate change presents very serious global risks, and it demands an
urgent global response.").
86. Indeed, some sea level rise has already been observed. IPCC, PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note
85, at 5, 7. Interestingly, this sea surface rise results not just from an increase in ocean volume as polar
icecaps melt, but also from a decrease in the density of ocean water as average water temperatures rise.
NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, What's up with Sea Level (June 2006), http://sealevel.jpl.nasa.gov/
newsroom/features/200606-1.html ("'Global sea level can rise for one of two reasons,' says JPL
oceanographer Dr. Josh Willis. 'One is when water gets hotter, it expands. The other is when water is
added to the ocean, which changes its mass. That happens, for example, when glaciers melt."').
87. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 15-18 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc-wg2.org/ (follow
"Summary for Policymakers" hyperlink) [hereinafter IPCC, IMPACTS]; see also Institute for Energy &
Environmental Research, supra note 17, at 12-36.
88. See generally IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 90 at 10-12; Institute for Energy & Environmental
Research, supra note 17, at 12-36; STERN REVIEW, supra note 85, at vi (summarizing likely effects on
the human environment).
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countries, posing "a grave threat to the developing world and a major obstacle
to continued poverty reduction." 8
9
Predicting which effects will happen where, and when, has proven
virtually impossible, but the best minds in the business have concluded that
warming is all but certain to impose enormous worldwide costs unless we take
drastic action to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. 90 For example, a
recent UK economist's report concludes that "if we don't act, the overall costs
and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5% of global
GDP" and up to "20% . . . or more . . . each year, now and forever." 9 1 The
same author estimates that the annual costs of stabilizing greenhouse gas
concentrations at a safe level would be "significant but manageable"--on the
order of 1% of GDP by 2050.92 These dollar figures need not be strictly
accurate for one to conclude that society should carefully evaluate the cost
effectiveness and feasibility of all serious suggestions for mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions.
2. Nuclear Power as Part of the Solution
One widely touted such suggestion is to increase reliance on nuclear
power. With respect to greenhouse gas emissions, nuclear power is cleaner than
traditional fuel sources and competitive with renewable technologies.
93
Moreover, nuclear power is cleaner even on a cradle-to-grave accounting that
takes full account of the greenhouse gases emitted in mining, processing,
transporting, storing, and disposing of radioactive fuels. 94 Thus, shifting some
percentage of U.S. energy production from traditional fuels to nuclear power
would provide climate change benefits. 95
It would not be feasible, however, to convert 100% of the U.S. power
sector to nuclear energy. Among other things, nuclear power is generally used
to meet baseload demand, meaning that additional (carbon-emitting) "peaker"
89. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vii (2006),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/4/3/ExecutiveSummary.pdf [hereinafter STERN
REVIEW EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]; see also IPCC, IMPACTS, supra note 87, at 12.
90. STERN REVIEW EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 89, at ix.
91. STERN REVIEW, supra note 85, at vi.
92. STERN REVIEW EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 89, at xii.
93. See Institute for Energy & Environmental Research, supra note 17.
94. Id.
95. This claim is, of course, tempered by the fact that existing atmospheric greenhouse gas
concentrations may make some warming inevitable, Press Release, Nat'l Sci. Found., Climate Change
Inevitable in 21st Century (Mar. 17, 2005), available at http://www.nsf.gov/news/newssumm.jsp?
cntnid=103108, and by other countries' growing contribution to the problem, see IAE: Build more
nuclear power plants, supra note 16 ("Within two years, [China will] produce more greenhouse gases
from human sources than the United States."). This Article focuses on the United States' nuclear
industry, however, in part because a worldwide shift to nuclear power is unlikely without significant
U.S. involvement. See MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR




facilities are necessary.96 Moreover, even if complete conversion were
possible, the United States would still contribute significantly to global
greenhouse gas emissions. As noted above, mining, processing, transporting,
storing, and disposing of radioactive fuels produce significant quantities of
greenhouse gases.9 7 Further, other sectors of the U.S. economy are significant
sources. The transportation sector, for example, currently accounts for about
one-third of U.S. energy-related carbon dioxide emissions.
98
An equally important and related point is that wholesale conversion to
nuclear power is not necessary to global greenhouse gas mitigation efforts.
Other approaches that could, in some combination, produce the necessary
emissions reductions include: reduced vehicle use; more efficient appliances,
buildings, and vehicles (for example hybrids and fuel cell vehicles); greater use
of wind and other renewable energy sources; better agricultural practices; use
of "clean coal" technologies; and further development and implementation of
carbon capture and storage technologies. 99 Comparing the costs, benefits, and
feasibility of nuclear power and these various other greenhouse gas reduction
alternatives is well beyond the scope of this Article; the important point for this
discussion is that the "nuclear option" is neither a complete solution to climate
change nor a necessary part of the country's efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. Accordingly, society must make a measured decision whether
significant investment in the sector is both practicable and worthwhile.
3. Scale of the Necessary Investment in Nuclear Power
One variable relevant to this choice, often overlooked in popular debates,
is the scale of the investment in nuclear energy that would be necessary to
make a dent in greenhouse gas emissions. It turns out, pivotally, that nuclear
96. Energy Information Agency, Nuclear Power and the Environment,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/nuclearenvissues.html (last visited Feb 27, 2008).
97. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
98. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, REP. No. DOE/EIA-0573(2005/es), EMISSIONS OF
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2005: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (Feb 2007), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/summary/pdf/0573(2005)es.pdf; see also U.S. EPA, REP. No.
430-R-06-002002, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2004 at ES-13
(April 2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads06/
06_CompleteReport.pdf.
99. Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the
Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 969-70 (2004) (describing fifteen so-called
"wedges," or potential carbon reduction approaches, any seven of which would be sufficient to stabilize
carbon emissions at their current levels for the next fifty years, thereby keeping open the possibility that
we could, eventually, develop the additional technologies necessary to reduce emissions still further and
stabilize atmospheric carbon concentrations); see also Roger A. Pielke, Jr., What Just Ain t So: It Is All
Too Easy To Underestimate The Challenges Posed By Climate Change, 443 NATURE 753, 753 (2006)
(reviewing WILLIAM SWEET, KICKING THE CARBON HABIT: GLOBAL WARMING AND THE CASE FOR
RENEWABLE AND NUCLEAR ENERGY (2006), and noting that "Pacala and Socolow recognize that what
they have proposed is only a start... [. E]ven after the successful implementation of seven of their
wedges by 2054, 'fossil fuel emissions must decline'. by about an additional two-thirds over the
subsequent 50 years.").
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power cannot significantly reduce the risk of climate change unless we commit
to a vast global investment in the technology. 00
To estimate the scale of the necessary investment over the next half-
century, one must first answer several preliminary questions. For example, how
is per capita power demand likely to grow in developed, developing, and least-
developed countries? How is each country's population likely to grow during
the same period? And what are the mid-century alternatives to nuclear power
likely to be? In 2050 will we still rely on coal, oil, and natural gas to supply
power needs that are not met by nuclear, or will other affordable alternatives
exist? 10 1
A 2003 interdisciplinary Massachusetts Institute of Technology study, The
Future of Nuclear Power ("MIT Study" or "Study"), makes a credible effort to
address these questions. 10 2 As a baseline, the authors use 2002 figures for
global electricity consumption, observing that in that year, nuclear power
accounted for 20% of U.S. electricity use and 17% of global use.10 3 The Study
then models mid-century electricity demand, using U.S. and UN predictions of
annual population growth and annual per capita growth in electricity
demand. 10 4 The resulting estimates of mid-century electricity use are
staggering, ranging up to a figure 180% higher than 2000 levels. 10 5 Moreover,
the Study's predictions for 2050 levels are relatively conservative, falling
100. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 25. ("From a public policy
perspective, the scenarios that merit analysis are either a large-scale deployment or a phase-out of
nuclear power over the next half-century."); accord Arjun Makhijani, Atomic Myths, Radioactive
Realities: Why Nuclear Power Is a Poor Way to Meet Energy Needs, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL.
L. 61, 66 (2004) ("If the world continues to use oil for transportation... [thousands] of nuclear power
plants will have to be built in the next four decades to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions.");
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 28 ("[T]he nuclear power option makes
sense only if possible deployment is quite large, since no small deployment can make a significant
contribution to dealing with the greenhouse gas problem.... Indeed it is misleading to focus on small
increases in nuclear capacity justified by significant CO2 reduction.").
101. This question is important because without some estimate of the mid-century level of
greenhouse gas emissions in the ahsence of a significant nuclear industry, one cannot predict either (1)
the level of emissions reductions necessary to abate global warming, or (2) the extent to which a given
investment in nuclear power would produce such reductions.
102. For skeptics, it is worth noting here that the MIT study cautiously supports expansion of the
nuclear sector. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at I.
103. Id.
104. Id. app. A at 109-15. The authors subdivided developing countries into three categories: more
advanced (projected to achieve a benchmark electricity demand of 4000 kWh per person per year by
2050); less advanced (projected to reach "acceptable" levels of energy demand in the range of 1500-
4000 kWh per person per year by 2050); and least advanced (unlikely to reach even 1000 kWh per
person per year by 2050).
105. Id. at 115. This increase represents an annual growth rate of 2.1%. By comparison, global
population is only projected to grow by about 50% in the same fifty year period. Id. at 115 tbl.A-2.Ie.
As may be obvious, growth in energy demand is projected to outstrip population growth principally
because developing countries' energy demand is likely to increase rapidly as their citizens' standards of
living improve.
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between the U.S. Energy Information Agency's "low growth" and "business as
usual" scenarios, and well below its "high growth" figures.
10 6
Next, the MIT authors consider various possible growth scenarios for the
nuclear power sector, from growth at a rate just sufficient to maintain nuclear
power at its current share of world electricity capacity (17%), to growth
sufficient to reach a market share of 25% by 2050.107 These scenarios are not
predictions; rather, they estimate the extent of deployment required for nuclear
power to maintain its current market share-a baseline that the authors use to
represent the minimum industry growth necessary for nuclear to play a
significant role in greenhouse gas reduction efforts. 
108
These calculations lead the authors to a mid-century estimate for the
nuclear industry of 1000 to 1500 gigawatts electric capacity ("GWe"). 10 9
Several things about this range are immediately noteworthy. First, it reflects an
increase of between 170% and 300% above current global nuclear capacity.1 10
Second, reaching the high end of the range would require construction of more
than 1100 new, large111 nuclear facilities somewhere in the world by 2050-
almost twenty-five per year, or about one every two weeks. 112 Of these, the
MIT authors speculate that nearly a third would be in the United States, for an
average construction rate of seven to ten large facilities per year. 113 By
comparison, in the heyday of nuclear power, "worldwide construction" of light
106. Id. at 110. The Energy Information Administration's scenarios end in 2020, but the curve on
which the MIT Study's maximum 2050 estimate is based falls between the EIA's "reference" and "low
growth" scenarios in the years 2000-2020. See id. at 110 fig.A-2.2. Not surprisingly, much of the
predicted expansion in electricity demand is expected to occur in the developing world. Id. at 20.
107. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 25. The authors do not
actually expect the nuclear power sector to follow any of these growth scenarios; they merely analyze
the scenarios to determine what changes would facilitate the necessary sector growth. That is, they
assume a worldwide decision to keep nuclear power at or above its current share of global power
production, and analyze what political and technological changes would be necessary to make that
happen.
108. One can, of course, quibble about the MIT Study's definition of "significant," but with energy
demand growing at the rates predicted by the EIA and others, see supra note 106 and accompanying
text, it seems reasonable to assert that if nuclear power is to have any real role to play in a climate
change strategy, it must at least maintain its current market share of just under 20%.
109. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 25 tbl.3.1.
110. Id. at 3; see also INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
REVIEW-UPDATE 2005 at 1 (2005), available at http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC49/
Documents/gc49inf-3.pdf.
111. Large nuclear plants have a capacity of about I GWe. If countries chose instead to build
smaller facilities, the rate of construction would have to be correspondingly higher.
112. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 25-28. Current capacity is
equivalent to 366 1 GWe plants. Achieving a global capacity of 1500 GWe would therefore require
construction of at least 1134 new large (1 GWe) facilities. This is an underestimate, however, because
some existing plants will undoubtedly need to be replaced by mid-century.
113. Id. at 26 tbl.3.2. This is the rate required to build the 300 1000 MWe plants hypothesized in
Table 3.2 over the course of forty years. Given that no plants are currently under construction in the
United States, and many existing plants are reaching the end of their lifecycles, however, building rates
toward the end of this half-century period would probably have to be considerably higher than ten large
plants per year.
[Vol. 35:31
2008] THE PERILS OF A HALF-B UILT BRIDGE
water reactors "totaled about 400 plants over 25 years, for an average of 16
plants completed per year." 114
The MIT study is not the only one to conclude that we must build
thousands of new nuclear plants in the next decades if we hope to make nuclear
power a real part of our climate change solution. The president of the Institute
for Energy and Environmental Research, for example, estimates that to achieve
a significant reduction in mid-century carbon dioxide emissions, we would
have to increase global nuclear capacity to about 2,000 GWe over the next four
decades, which in turn would necessitate a plant construction rate of about fifty
per year or one per week.' 15 And an important recent Science article on climate
change, which identifies policy alternatives to stabilize greenhouse gas
emissions by mid-century, indicates that even if nuclear power is just one of
seven strategies on which we place equal reliance, we must increase capacity
by about 700 GWe by 2050 (or almost twenty new large plants each year).1 16
Finally, to drive home the point that only a truly massive investment in
nuclear power will permit the industry to play a nonnegligible role in mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions, it is worth emphasizing that the hypothetical
deployments discussed above would fall far short of solving the climate
problem. Indeed, constructing the new plants that would be necessary to reach
the low end of the MIT Study's hypothetical range would avoid only about a
quarter of the anticipated growth in anthropogenic carbon emissions between
2000 and 2050.117
114. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
115.
If the world continues to use oil for transportation ... a very large number of nuclear power
plants [would] have to be built in the next four decades to mitigate carbon dioxide emissions.
... In order to make a significant dent in CO2 emissions, at least one-third, and perhaps one-
half or more of the global growth in electricity demand must be supplied by nuclear power.
In any scenario involving two percent or greater global electricity growth, the use of nuclear
power will mean the construction of thousands of nuclear power plants in the next four
decades. Consider for instance, an electricity growth rate of two percent, which is far less
than that occurring in China and India, but more or less typical of recent U.S. trends. To
make a substantial contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, we might hypothesize
that (i) all present day nuclear power plants will be replaced by new ones, (ii) half the
electricity growth will be provided by nuclear power, and (iii) half of the world's coal-fired
plants will be replaced by nuclear power plants. This would mean that about two thousand
large (1,000 megawatts each) nuclear power plants would have to be built over the next four
decades. That is a rate of about one per week.
Makhijani, supra note 100, at 66 (emphasis added).
116. Pacala & Socolow, supra note 99, at 970 tbl. l. As noted above, these authors identify policies
that could stabilize emissions by 2050. These policies fall far short of what would be required to
stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, as will eventually be necessary to avert
climate change. See Pielke, supra note 99, at 753.
117. To make this calculation, the MIT authors assume that "[d]espite the efforts to promote
renewable energy options, . . . a large fraction of the incremental and replacement investments in electric
generating capacity needed to balance supply and demand over the next 50 years will, in the absence of
a nuclear generation option, rely on fossil-fuels." MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra
note 95, at 37. For purposes of this discussion, the important implication of this passage is that for the
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4. Economic Incentives to Boost the Nuclear Sector
What would it take, then, to stimulate growth of the U.S. nuclear sector at
a rate far higher than that in the heyday of the industry? At the very least,
regulators would have to address the dismal economics of nuclear power.
The first commercial nuclear power plant opened its doors in
Shippingport, Pennsylvania, in 1957. In the next four decades, just over 100
reactors came online at sixty-five sites in thirty-one states. Since 1978,
however, no new plants have been ordered and more than 100 reactor contracts
have been canceled. 118 No units are currently under construction, though there
are twenty-two submitted applications with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) for licenses to build and operate thirty-three new
reactors. 119 Given regulatory constraints, a potentially rate-limiting supply
chain for reactor parts, and the need to train new nuclear operators, though,
industry analysts predict that some new reactors will not be completed until
2020.120 Even if these new reactors eventually come online, the industry will
have seen zero growth for decades. 121 The same is true in many other
countries-a $4 billion nuclear plant now facing costly construction setbacks in
Finland, for example, is the first plant to be built in Europe in fifteen years. 122
Writers on all sides of the nuclear debate agree that the principal reason
for the industry's present state is the high cost of nuclear power. 123 While
operating plants are generally competitive with coal- and natural gas-fired
power plants, construction costs for new plants are prohibitively high.124
Indeed, assuming moderate gas prices, the levelized cost of electricity from a
new nuclear plant is about 60% higher than from a new coal or gas plant. 125
Although a national tax on carbon emissions would even this playing field
somewhat, the tax would have to be near the upper end of the literature range
foreseeable future, it is appropriate to use fossil-fuel emission rates as a conservative baseline in
calculating how additional nuclear capacity would affect greenhouse gas emissions. Painting an overly
rosy picture of mid-century energy production (e.g., assuming that by 2050, 50% of U.S. electricity will
be supplied by wind and solar power) would understate the necessary level of investment in nuclear.
118. Mark Holt, Nuclear Energy Policy 1 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order
Code 1388090, Oct. 26, 2004), available at http://www.iags.org/CRSIB88090.pdf.
119. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Expected New Nuclear Power Plant Applications: Updated
April 28, 2008, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-licensing/new-licensing-files/expected-new-rx-
applications.pdf.
120. Matthew L. Wald, Plan to Build Reactors Is Running Into Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007,
at Cl.
121. The last U.S. reactor to come online (the Tennessee Valley Authority's Watts Bar reactor in
Tennessee) was ordered in 1970 and licensed in 1996.
122. David Gauthier-Villars, Trials of Nuclear Rebuilding, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2007, at A6.
123. See, e.g., MARTIN CASTELLANO ET AL., UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF
NUCLEAR POWER, at xi (2004); Holt, supra note 118, at 2; MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at ix; NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, POSITION PAPER:
COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER 5-6 (2005), available at http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/power/power.pdf.
124. See, e.g., Holt, supra note 118, at 2; NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, supra note
123, at 6.
125. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 42 tbl.5.1.
[Vol. 35:31
THE PERILS OF A HALF-BUILT BRIDGE
($100-200 per ton of carbon) before nuclear becomes fully cost competitive.126
To "make early nuclear plants more competitive," therefore, researchers at the
University of Chicago suggest such federal policies as "loan guarantees,
accelerated depreciation, investment tax credits, and production tax credits." 127
The Energy Policy Act of 2005128 made some of these changes. For
example, it created a $125 million per year per gigawatt tax credit for up to six
gigawatts of new nuclear capacity (about six large plants) for up to eight years
of operation-in other words, up to six plants could receive up to $1 billion
each in production tax credits. 129 The Act also extended the Price-Anderson
Act's liability indemnification provisions (and pool of funds) for another
twenty years, to 2025.130 In addition, it addressed the historic problem of
regulatory delays, authorizing the Department of Energy to reimburse utilities
for up to $500 million in costs related to NRC delays. Finally, the Act
established a federal loan guarantee program, backing up to 80% of
construction costs, to improve the odds of repayment for lenders, who have
historically charged higher interest rates for nuclear plant construction loans. 131
These and other recent changes (including higher natural gas prices), have
contributed to some utilities' growing interest in building new nuclear
plants. 132 As yet, however, no utilities have dedicated resources to nuclear
power development at the level that would be necessary to build seven to ten
new plants per year for the next four decades. If those numbers even
approximate our goal, the billions of dollars of economic incentives provided in
the Energy Policy Act fall far short of what would ultimately be necessary.
126. Id. at42.
127. See, e.g., MARSHALL GOLDBERG, FEDERAL ENERGY SUBSIDIES: NOT ALL TECHNOLOGIES
ARE CREATED EQUAL 3 (2000), available at http://www.crest.org/repp_pubs/pdf/subsidies.pdf ("From
1943 to 1999, cumulative federal government subsidies to [nuclear, wind, photovoltaic, and solar
thermal electricity generating technologies] ... totaled almost $151 billion (in 1999 dollars)," of which
the "nuclear industry received $145.4 billion, or over 96 percent."); Holt, supra note 118, at 13, 18, 21
tbl.3 (indicating that in 2007, Congress appropriated almost $800 million to the Department of Energy
for civilian nuclear power research and development, and another half a billion dollars for civilian
nuclear waste disposal). Note further that these figures do not include the vast sums in indirect subsidies
from nuclear research and development activities undertaken in connection with national defense.
128. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (Aug. 8, 2005).
129. See Notice 2006-40, 2006-18 I.R.B. 855 (intemal Revenue Service, implementing the credit).
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2006).
131. Holt, supra note 118, at 5.
132. Id.; see also NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE, U.S. NEEDS NEW NUCLEAR PLANTS TO MEET
ENERGY DEMAND, MAINTAIN SUPPLY DIVERSITY (2007), available at http://www.nei.org/
filefolder/U _S Needs NewNuclearPlants to Meet EnergyDemand_MaintainSupplyDiversity_
1007.pdf; David A. Repka & Kathryn M. Sutton, The Revival of Nuclear Power Plant Licensing, 19
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 39 (2005); Nuclear Energy Institute, New Nuclear Plants,
http://www.nei.org/keyissues/newnuclearplants (last visited Mar. 3, 2008).
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5. Risks and Possible Regulatory Reforms
Growing the nuclear sector at the MIT Study's hypothetical rate would
pose significant risks. The Study authors discuss these risks in three categories:
safety, proliferation, and waste.
a. Reactor Safey
The Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania and the Chemobyl
disaster in the former Soviet Union highlight one of the most salient nuclear
power risks-the chance of leakage from or meltdown of a reactor. Investing
heavily in the nuclear sector would also raise other safety concerns, though,
including the increased likelihood of either a natural disaster (for example an
earthquake or flood) or a terrorist attack at a nuclear plant. Moreover, other
than meltdown, none of these concerns is confined to energy-producing
reactors; they extend to the various components of the nuclear fuel cycle,
including fuel fabrication facilities, waste handling, storage, and disposal
facilities, and, if a closed fuel cycle is used, fuel reprocessing facilities. 133
The important risk factors, then, are (1) the likelihoods of these various
disasters, and (2) their projected costs, not just in people injured or killed, but
in disruption of power supplies, destruction of capital assets, and--of particular
relevance to this Article about public risk perception-erosion of "public
confidence in nuclear generation."' 13
4
Unfortunately, yet predictably, the likelihood of a nuclear disaster
increases with significant expansion of the nuclear sector. Experts who have
evaluated the disaster issue with probabilistic risk assessment conclude that,
assuming current technology, the "best estimate of core damage frequency [is]
about 1 in 10,000 reactor-years." 135 For the current U.S. fleet of about 100
reactors, this works out to a rate of about one accident per century. But a three-
fold increase in nuclear capacity-what the MIT Study dubs a "global growth
scenario"-would yield an expected core accident rate of four by 2055.136
Harvard professor of earth and planetary sciences Daniel Schrag agrees with
this dire prediction: "Think about a world with 10,000 nuclear reactors .... We
have only a few hundred today. What is the probability of a big accident? It's
going to happen."' 37
That likelihood only increases when one accounts for the possibility of a
terrorist attack. In the United States, all licensed commercial plants are required
to have a series of physical barriers and a trained security force. 138 But the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 essentially admitted the inadequacy of existing
133. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 47-51.
134. Id. at 48.
135. Id.; see also Holt, supra note 118, at 13.
136. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 48.
137. Jonathan Shaw, Fueling Our Future, HARV. MAG., May-June 2006, at 39,41.
138. Holt, supranote 118, at 15.
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security procedures, requiring the NRC (1) to revise its "design basis threat"
(the most severe threat for which plants must be prepared) based on estimates
of terrorist threats (including suicide attacks) and the possibility of several
coordinated attacks; (2) to conduct security exercises at nuclear facilities every
few years; and (3) to fingerprint all nuclear facility workers. 139
With respect to the costs of an accident, the news is more mixed. On the
one hand, the U.S. nuclear industry's single true accident-Three Mile
Island--caused no deaths or injuries to workers or neighboring citizens, 140 and
a health study of more than 30,000 people who lived within five miles of the
reactor at the time of the accident found no statistically significant increase in
cancer rates (through 1998).141 The Chernobyl accident was far more serious,
killing more than thirty people within hours or days, necessitating the
immediate evacuation of 116,000 people and the subsequent evacuation of an
additional 230,000, and releasing "massive amounts of radioactivity into the
environment." 142 Even in Chernobyl, though, the most recent United Nations
health figures are more (albeit not wholly) positive:
[T]he total number of people that could have died or could die in the future
due to Chemobyl originated exposure over the lifetime of emergency
workers and residents of most contaminated areas is estimated to be around
4,000. This total includes some 50 emergency workers who died of acute
radiation syndrome (ARS) in 1986 and other causes in later years; 9
children who died of thyroid cancer; and an estimated 3,940 people that
could die from cancer contracted as a result of radiation exposure. The
latter number accounts for the 200,000 emergency and recovery operation
workers from 1986-1987, 116,000 evacuees, and 270,000 residents of most
contaminated areas.
143
These are not insignificant numbers, but they are hardly shocking,
particularly when compared to other relevant risks. Coal mining accidents, for
example, kill seventeen miners per day in China1 44 and almost fifty per year in
the United States. 145
139. Id.
140. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Fact Sheet on the Three Mile Island Accident (Feb 29,
2007), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html; see also CHERNOBYL
FORUM, CHERNOBYL'S LEGACY: HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS 3 (2005),
available at http://un.by/pdf/HighlightsRecommendations+Figs-rev-acc.pdf.
141. Holt, supra note 118, at 7 (citing Evelyn 0. Talbott et al., Long Term Follow-Up of the
Residents of the Three Mile Island Accident Area: 1979-1998, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 341 (2003)).
The authors of the study noted, though, that some health effects "[could] not be definitively excluded."
Id.
142. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Fact Sheet on the Accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Plant (December 2000), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/
fschemobyl.html.
143. CHERNOBYL FORUM, supra note 140, at 5.
144. China Sets Coal Mine Accident Reduction Goal, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE (ENGLISH), Mar. 1,
2007, http://english.people.com.cn/200703/01/eng20070301 353481 .html.
145. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Injury Trends in Mining, http://www.msha.gov/MSHAINFO/
FactSheets/MSHAFCT2.HTM (last visited March 3, 2008).
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Both regulators and the public naturally fear that the next nuclear accident
will be more serious, release more radiation, and cause more immediate and
long-term deaths. Even an accident that exacts a low public health toll imposes
significant other costs. Plant loss imposes billions of dollars in upfront costs
and could restrict local electrical generating capacity. 146 And perhaps more
significantly, for this Article's purpose at least, a serious, widely reported
accident-or even a near miss-could well derail efforts to revitalize the
nuclear industry as a partial solution to climate change. As Professor Schrag
puts it, "[T]he impact of Chernobyl is not measured in terms of deaths .... The
world got scared of nuclear power."
147
b. Proliferation
A related risk of growing the nuclear sector is the possibility that
technology proliferation could lead to weapons proliferation, either because
weapons-usable material is "diverted" by a subnational terrorist group, or
because a nation that does not currently have nuclear weapons chooses to
misuse its fuel cycle and research facilities-and its knowledgeable nuclear
engineers-to produce them. 14 8 To date, "[s]pent fuel discharged from power
reactors worldwide contains well over 1000 tonnes [(2.24 million pounds)] of
plutonium. . . .With modest nuclear infrastructure, any nation could .. .
[separate the plutonium with high purity] . . .at the scale needed to acquire
material for several weapons." 14 9 Reprocessing facilities in Europe, Russia, and
Japan have already accumulated about 200 tonnes (448,000 pounds) of
separated plutonium--enough to build 25,000 weapons. 150
The risks associated with this accumulation of radioactive materials are
manifest-and they grow rapidly under the various plausible scenarios for mid-
century nuclear plant deployment. For example, by 2050 the "developing world
might plausibly account for about a third of deployed nuclear power" and
"dramatic growth of nuclear power in the sub-continent could be a pathway for
nuclear arsenal expansion in India and Pakistan."'151
c. Waste
In addition to ensuring facilities' operational safety and limiting the threat
of nuclear weapons proliferation, the nuclear industry must also safely dispose
of the massive quantities of radioactive waste produced by existing and new
facilities. To understand the Herculean nature of this task, one must first have a
sense of the scope of the waste issue. According to the Department of Energy's
146. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 48.
147. Shaw, supra note 137, at 41.
148. MASSACHUSETrS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 65.
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(DOE) Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, as of 2005, the
United States had accumulated about 53,440 tonnes (120 million pounds) of
spent fuel from nuclear reactors. 152 Under current regulations, the proposed
Yucca Mountain underground storage facility in Nevada could someday
contain all of this waste. The Yucca Mountain facility would not come close,
however, to solving the waste disposal problem for the MIT Study's proposed
new plants.
A worldwide deployment of one thousand [large reactors]...with today's
fuel management characteristics would generate roughly three times as
much spent fuel annually as does today's nuclear power plant fleet. If this
fuel was disposed of directly, new repository storage capacity equal to the
currently planned capacity of the Yucca Mountain facility would have be to
created somewhere in the world roughly every three or four years. For the
United States, a three-fold increase in nuclear generating capacity would
create a requirement for a Yucca Mountain equivalent of storage capacity
roughly every 12 years.1 53
For nuclear power simply to maintain its current share of the electricity
sector over the next half-century, then, the world would have to build between
eleven and fifteen new (and operational) "Yucca Mountains," and the United
States would have to build about four. One need only review Yucca Mountain's
pathetic history to recognize the near impossibility of this task:
1978: DOE began studying Yucca Mountain, in Nevada, to determine its
suitability as the "nation's first long-term geologic repository for [the] spent
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste... [c]urrently stored at 126 sites
around the nation." 1
54
1982: Congress first directed the federal government to take responsibility
for permanently disposing of the nuclear waste. 155
1984: DOE formally identified Yucca Mountain as a potential site for a
permanent geologic repository. 156
1987: To cut down on costs and regulatory delays, Congress focused
DOE's attentions exclusively on Yucca Mountain. 157
152. Dep't of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, How Much Nuclear
Waste Is in the United States?, http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ym_repository/about_project/
wasteexplained/howmuch.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
153. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 61.
154. Dep't of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Yucca Mountain
Repository, http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ymrepository/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).
155. Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1982) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2006)).
156. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
157. Id at 1260.
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2001-2002: EPA, NRC, and DOE issued health and safety standards,
licensing standards, and site-suitability criteria, respectively, to govern the
Yucca Mountain facility. The State of Nevada and various other groups filed
suit challenging both the rules and the underlying decision to focus all federal
waste disposal efforts on the Yucca Mountain site. 158
2004: The D.C. Circuit struck down aspects of the EPA and NRC rules,
holding that the agencies had no scientific basis for their use of a 10,000-year
limit on radiation releases from the repository. 159 The agencies went back to
the drawing board.
2005: DOE disclosed emails from geologists that made clear that some
Yucca Mountain safety documents had been falsified. 160 Senator Harry Reid
(D-NV) stated, "It should be obvious to everyone now that Yucca Mountain
isn't going anywhere. It is abundantly clear that there is no such thing as sound
science at Yucca Mountain." 1 61
2006: Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman told members of the House
Appropriations Committee that construction of the Yucca Mountain repository
probably would not begin until at least 2011.162 DOE's "Best-Achievable
Repository Construction Schedule" indicated that the repository could not
possibly begin receiving wastes for disposal until March 31, 2017.163
2008: Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) introduced a bill that would establish
a phased licensing regime, under which the Yucca repository would be used as
a waste storage and monitoring (rather than disposal) facility for the next
several centuries before finally being sealed. 164
158. Id. at 1260-61.
159. Specifically, the court held that the agencies had no reason to select 10,000 years rather than a
longer limit that would correspond more closely to the million-year "time scale of the long-term stability
of the fundamental geologic regime ... at Yucca Mountain." Id. at 1267, 1315.
160. Holt, supra note 118, at 19.
161. Statement of Senator Harry Reid Before the Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce and
Agency Organization of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform,
"Yucca Mountain Project: Have Federal Employees Falsified Documents?" (Apr. 5, 2005),
http://democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=236002&; see also Yucca Mountain Project:
Have Federal Employees Falsified Documents?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Federal
Workforce and Agency Organization of the H. Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Apr. 5,
2005) (Ser. No. 109-60).
162. See Institute for Energy & Environmental Research note 17, at 15.
163. Dep't of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Yucca Mountain
Repository: About the Project, http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/ymrepository/about_project/index.shtml
(last visited Feb. 28, 2008).
164. Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 2008, S. 2551, 11 Oth Cong. (2008).
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In sum, the federal government has had its eyes on Yucca Mountain for
more than a quarter century, yet it does not plan to break ground until 2011,
waste disposal will not begin until 2017 at the earliest, and even that delayed
timeline remains open to debate and modification. The implications are clear.
As of 2017, the Yucca project will have been in the works for forty years.
Assuming consecutive implementation of each of the MIT Study's four
hypothetical repositories, following a site selection, licensing, litigation,
construction, and testing schedule like that of Yucca Mountain, we could
expect the fourth to open its doors well after the middle of the twenty-second
century.
d. Regulatory Reforms to Address These Risks
Given the serious safety, proliferation, and waste problems associated with
deployment of new nuclear plants, it should be clear that safe reinvigoration of
the nuclear sector requires regulatory action-and, in turn, the political will to
push the necessary reforms through the relevant legislatures and agencies. This
Article does not attempt to list, let alone discuss, all of the reforms that experts
have proposed. A brief summary of a few waste management-related
suggestions suffices to make the point on which this discussion turns-if we
hope to make nuclear power a safe and significant part of our climate change
strategy, we must significantly amend the regulatory landscape.
The MIT Study identifies the management and disposal of high-level
radioactive waste as "one of the primary obstacles to the development of the
nuclear power industry around the world." 165 The Study urges several specific
regulatory changes, including (1) "replacing the current ad hoc approach to
spent fuel storage with an explicit strategy to store spent fuel for a period of
several decades, prior to reprocessing [or] geologic disposal"; (2) building
"centralized facilities for storing spent fuel for several decades," both in the
United States and internationally; (3) broadening U.S. waste-related research
and development efforts to encompass approaches other than permanent
geologic disposal; (4) organizationally separating the research and development
program from waste management operations "to resist pressures to narrow the
scope of the R&D program"; (5) upping the current per-kilowatt-hour fee
charged to plant operators for waste management, both to improve the financial
position of the federal waste program and to increase utilities' incentives to
develop waste minimization strategies; and (6) "actively pursu[ing] closer
international coordination of standards and regulations for waste transportation,
storage and disposal."' 66 These and other potential changes in the current
regulatory regime would, in turn, pressure relevant agencies to make additional
165. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 86.
166. Id. at 85-87.
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changes, notably including updating the accounting methods and assumptions
they use to estimate the adequacy of waste-related funding. 1
67
Each of these suggestions for regulatory reform may seem achievable on
its face. But after close to thirty years of legal wrangling, we are still several
years shy of breaking ground at Yucca Mountain. Imagine the political and
legal battles that would likely ensue if, for example, the government announced
plans to build centralized facilities equipped to store high-level waste for
several decades, as the MIT Study recommends. Clearly, "support for keeping
the nuclear power option open... depend[s] on convincing the public and their
elected representatives that large-scale deployment can overcome" the
technology's economic, safety, proliferation, and waste problems. 1
68
B. We Can 't Get Therefrom Here
Are policymakers likely to be successful in making the case for a vast
expansion of nuclear power? Due to the tiered structure of the nuclear power
risk, the answer is probably either "no" or "only partially," and, interestingly,
there are reasons why we might prefer "no."
1. Simple Failure
The first possible outcome of any effort to "sell" nuclear power to a
skeptical public is outright failure.
Entrenched fears could prove resistant to even the most carefully designed
education efforts. Due to the heuristics and biases discussed above, people tend
to fear nuclear power more than climate change. As Gregory N. Mandel has
observed, nuclear power's attributes "read like a laundry list of aggravating
traits concerning risk. Th[is] technolog[y's] risks commonly are perceived to
be: dread, uncontrollable, potentially catastrophic, fatal,'inequitably distributed,
place future generations at risk, involuntary, not observable, unknown, new,
irreversible, human created, complex, and unfamiliar."'169 In short, nuclear
power occupies an "extreme position[] in psychometric factor space[].' 170 The
167. See, e.g., Michael A. Mullett, Financing for Eternity the Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A
Crisis of Law and Policy Precipitated by Electric Deregulation Will Face New President, 18 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 383, 455-56 (2001) ("[E]lectric industry restructuring may be expected to precipitate a
crisis for current law and policy, the resolution of which will require significant changes in the structure
and financing of the Nuclear Waste Fund.").
168. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, supra note 95, at 28.
169. Gregory N. Mandel, Technology Wars: The Failure of Democratic Discourse, 11 MICH.
TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 117, 161 n.152 (2005).
170. Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 3, at 220, 229; see
also Wouter Poortinga, Nick Pidgeon, & Irene Lorenzoni, Public Perceptions of Nuclear Power,
Climate Change and Energy Options in Britain: Summary Findings of Survey Conducted During
October and November 2005, at 7 (School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia,
Understanding Risk Working Paper 06-02, 2006), available at http://tyndall.webappl.uea.ac.uk/
publications/energyfutures full report.pdf ("The general stigma, which we know is invariably attached
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risks of climate change, on the other hand, are less well known and less
"available" to the imagination. Historically at least, people have shown little
understanding of climate-related dangers, and even less willingness to take on
significant costs to avoid them. 171
U.S. antiproliferation rhetoric only reinforces this dichotomy. Political
discussion of the risk that Iran and North Korea could use nuclear power
facilities for bomb development 72 heightens public fear of nuclear power. To
make matters worse, experts suggest that at the scale of nuclear deployment
envisioned in the MIT Study, another big nuclear accident is all but certain-
and such an accident is all but certain to erase any gains in public
acceptance.17
3
Thus, a large scale effort to convince the public to endorse nuclear power
(whether based on the bounded rationality model or on cultural cognition)
might prove a colossal waste of money. A series of memorable Katrina-like
events could, of course, increase public concern about climate issues, and
correspondingly increase acceptance of alternatives (possibly including nuclear
power). Absent such a catastrophe, however, an education campaign may do
little to reshape attitudes. 174
2. Partial Success
Utter failure of a pro-nuclear campaign may be preferable to the other
likely outcome of such a campaign: partial success that leaves us at a regulatory
dead end, with a booming nuclear industry but without the political will to push
through comprehensive safety, proliferation, and waste regulations.
We could arrive at this perhaps incongruous final position in one of two
ways, each of which turns on the division of the nuclear risk into preliminary,
or first-tier, risks (those associated with reactor safety) and collateral, or
to nuclear power, remains. Many respondents think that it creates dangerous waste (84% agree or
strongly agree) and is a hazard to human health (70%).").
171. Nancy Stauffer, Climate Change Poorly Understood, Not a High Priority, Shows MIT Public
Survey, ESD REPORTS (Engineering Systems Division, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, Mass.), Summer 2005, http://esd.mit.edu/esdreports/summer2005/climate_change.html;
see also Jon Palfreman, A Tale of Two Fears: Exploring Media Depictions of Nuclear Power and
Global Warming, 23 REV. POL'Y RES. 23, 24 (2006) (detailing the results of focus groups on nuclear
power and climate change and asking, "What accounts for such widely differing public attitudes?").
172. E.g., Howard LaFranchi, Iran's Pursuit of Nuclear Power Raises Alarms, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 27 2007, at 1.
173. See supra notes 137 & 147 and accompanying text.
174. Indeed, early results of an effort to use the affirmation effect in this way have been
disappointing. See Poortinga et al., supra note 170, at 1-2 ("A recent reanalysis of data linking the
issues of climate change and radioactive waste from a national comparative survey and focus groups ...
shows that people do interpret nuclear energy in a different way when it is positioned alongside climate
change. In effect, people in the focus groups became more ambivalent and less antagonistic about
nuclear power as an energy source. Despite this, few of our participants actively and wholeheartedly




second-tier, risks (those associated with mining, transport, processing, storage,
and disposal of radioactive materials). Second-tier risks might elicit more fear,
and thus more public opposition, than first-tier risks, either because these
collateral risks trigger more, or more significant, perceptual biases (more dread,
less well understood, etc. 17 5) or because the collateral risks are politically
"hotter" and more culturally divisive. 
176
For example, consider basic reactor safety (first-tier), on the one hand, and
waste risks (second-tier), on the other. We are used to seeing reactors on our
city skylines; they have good safety records, at least in recent years; their
technology is reasonably well understood and familiar; and 103 existing
facilities spread around the nation already supply close to 20% of our power. In
contrast, waste handling facilities present new and less well understood risks;
they use unfamiliar technologies; and the waste goes in tanks, pools, or
underground, where we cannot see it and reassure ourselves of its continued
containment. The theory therefore suggests that people may prove more fearful
of waste-related issues than of reactors themselves. 
177
John Weingart offers a stark account of the depth of public fear of
radioactive waste sites. Director of New Jersey's Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Disposal Facility Siting Board in the 1990's, Weingart tried to find a New
Jersey community willing to host a radioactive waste facility for low-level
waste (that is, lightly contaminated waste from medical facilities and other
sources, which is typically far less dangerous than that from nuclear power
operations178). At first, Weingart was optimistic about his chances of success.
But when it came time to accept such a facility in their "backyards," people
simply could not let go of their fears.
At the Siting Board's open houses, people would invent scenarios and then
dare Board members and staff to say they were impossible. A person would
ask, "What would happen if a plane crashed into a concrete bunker filled
with radioactive waste and exploded?" We would explain that while the
plane and its contents might explode, nothing in the disposal facility could.
And they would say, "But what if explosives had mistakenly been disposed
of, and the monitoring devices at the facility had malfunctioned so they
weren't noticed?" We would head down the road of saying that this was an
extremely unlikely set of events. And they would say, "Well, it could
happen, couldn't it?
179
175. See supra Part II.B..2.
176. See supra Part II.B.2.-.3. Poortinga et al.'s results tend to support this dichotomy, albeit
weakly: in a comprehensive empirical survey of British public opinion on future energy options for the
United Kingdom, they found that 84 percent of respondents feared nuclear power's waste products,
while only 70 percent feared the technology itself. Poortinga et al., supra note 170, at 7.
177. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
178. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Low-Level Waste, http://www.nrc.gov/waste/low-
level-waste.html (last visited Feb 26, 2008).
179. JOHN WEINGART, WASTE IS A TERRIBLE THING TO MIND: RISK, RADIATION, AND DISTRUST
OF GOVERNMENT 362 (2001).
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It is at least possible, then, that the public will feel a little better about new
reactors than about the new waste storage, processing, and disposal facilities
that those reactors necessitate. As a result, a majority could learn to accept
reactor construction but continue to fight necessary collateral actions like
siting, construction, and operation of waste storage and disposal facilities. Our
present situation affords an example of the public's ability to hold such
seemingly incongruous beliefs. We now have an operating (if somewhat
stagnant) nuclear industry that supplies close to 20% of our power, yet we have
fought tooth and nail, thus far successfully, against development of a
permanent radioactive waste disposal facility. There are very real problems
with the Yucca Mountain site, but nothing about that battle suggests that a more
geologically appropriate site choice would have ensured a less contentious
licensing process.
The current situation in France provides further evidence that people can
hold tight to seemingly incompatible views about nuclear power and its
collateral risks. There, nuclear energy makes up more than 75% of the electric
power sector, and the public largely supports the industry. 180 When it came
time to develop a waste facility, however, people balked. There were
widespread demonstrations and even riots. And the problem has yet to be
solved. 18 1
The second, even more intractable impact of the tiered structure of the
nuclear power risk is only relevant under the cultural cognition model. As
noted above, 182 cultural cognition theorists suggest that it may be possible to
overcome public opposition to a particular policy choice by structuring policy
proposals to affirm multiple groups' worldviews simultaneously. According to
this idea, policymakers could potentially make headway in the nuclear debate
by expressly pushing nuclear power as part of the country's response to climate
change. By affirming individualists' and hierarchists' positive views of nuclear
power, this approach could reduce such individuals' "political[]" and
"cognitive[] . . . resistance . . . to the proposition that global warming is a
problem after all."' 183 At the same time, "when egalitarians and solidarists are
180. One possible explanation for this support is that the French are somewhat more hierarchical
than Americans, and hence more willing to believe assurances from their leaders that nuclear power is
safe. Jon Palfreman, Why the French Like Nuclear Energy, FRONTLINE, July 13 2006,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/reaction/readings/french.html ("[S]cientists and
engineers have a much higher status in France than in America. Many high ranking civil servants and
government officials trained as scientists and engineers (rather than lawyers, as in the United States),
and, unlike in the U.S.... these technocrats form a special elite.").
181. Id. ("Things were going very well until the late 80s when another nuclear issue surfaced that
threatened to derail their very successful program: nuclear waste. . . . The same rural regions that had
actively lobbied to become nuclear power plant sites were openly hostile to the idea of being selected as
France's nuclear waste dump .... There were riots.").
182. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
183. Kahan & Braman, Cultural Cognition, supra note 14, at 169.
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exposed to the same information, they are likely to perceive nuclear power to
be less dangerous."' 184
The fly in the ointment is that the resulting coalition is likely to support
one thing and one thing only: market-based incentives for more nuclear power
development. Individualists and hierarchists are unlikely to support the
necessary top-down regulatory controls for the second-tier risks of the uranium
fuel cycle. Why would they? The impetus for their support of the sector is their
positive views of nuclear power; nothing about the affirmation effect seems
likely to increase their concern about nuclear power's side effects. Moreover
individualists and hierarchists are predisposed to favor market-based solutions
to social problems, making them that much less likely to recognize a need for
command-and-control waste- or proliferation-related reforms. Thus, while it
may be possible to build a coalition to support industry-stimulating government
programs, that coalition is all but doomed to be unstable when confronted with
nuclear power's collateral risks.
In conclusion, then, both the bounded rationality and cultural cognition
models suggest that a public education campaign about the "nuclear option"
could overcome opposition to nuclear sector growth, but could well fail to build
adequate support for second-tier command-and-control regimes. For all the
reasons discussed above (risks related to reactor safety, nuclear weapons
proliferation and radioactive materials), significant sector growth is only safe if
there is parallel regulatory progress on all levels. Thus, depending on the
relative sizes of the climate change and nuclear power risks, idiosyncratic
public support for the nuclear sector could actually prove harmful, leaving us
worse off than under the status quo.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE NUCLEAR POWER DEBATE
The debate about the role of nuclear power in our climate change strategy
is concededly unique, pitting risks about which the public has sticky attitudes
against risks that are diffuse, scientifically complex, and virtually impossible to
quantify with any certainty. Nevertheless, the conclusions of Part III have
broad application both within and outside the risk context.
First, as Sunstein and others have noted, some risks are "hot."'185 Risks
may be hot (1) because people have strong affective responses to them,
solidified by recent newspaper accounts, and made partisan by effects like
group polarization and normative bias; or instead (2) because the risks trigger
cultural or political biases. Regardless of the root cause, however, perceptions
about hot risks will prove resilient to most and perhaps all efforts to shift public
opinion. In particular, it may not be possible to shift opinions about a hot risk
(nuclear) by making dire predictions about a "cooler" one (climate change).
This is not a surprising observation, but it is worth noting, if only to temper the
184. Id. at 170.
185. Sunstein, Misfearing, supra note 6, at 1115.
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enthusiasm of those who blithely assume that the choice to reinvigorate the
nuclear industry in response to climate change is one that regulators can make
without considering public opinion.
The more interesting lesson from the nuclear power debate concerns the
structure of risks. Many risks involve tradeoffs-as Sunstein puts it, "There are
risks on all sides of social situations." 186 Addressing the most obvious "first"
risk, then, will almost always create, expose, or augment some related or
derivative risk. When the underlying risk layers are of the same nature as the
first, there is reason to hope that both expert and lay risk assessors will reach
some reasonable middle ground, recognizing and accepting the need to balance
regulatory responses to achieve a sensible overall policy. Thus, for example,
when air bags turned out to cause some deaths in car accidents, regulators were
quick to realize that some people (infants in car seats and small children)
should be discouraged from sitting in a seat "protected" by an air bag. 187 For
these people, the derivative risks of the first order regulatory change (requiring
airbags) proved greater than the hazard that regulation sought to correct. But
because the first- and second-tier problems were similar in kind-injuries and
deaths in car accidents-there was little disagreement about the proper
solution: scale back the notion that all passengers should be protected by
airbags. Instead, passengers of the right size and weight should be protected by
airbags, while others should be protectedfrom air bags. 188
In contrast, when the first and second risk layers differ in kind (differently
certain, differently controllable, differently catastrophic, triggering different
normative biases, and even receiving different news coverage) there is every
reason to be concerned that first-tier action will lead directly to a peculiar form
of regulatory dead end-in mathematical terms, a local minimum. As discussed
above, for instance, action to stimulate the nuclear industry could well lead to
development of second-tier risks that trigger different public reactions. In turn,
these second-tier risks could prove more intractable than the initial regulatory
dilemma, leaving us frozen in a regulatory position that few would have chosen
at the outset.
There is a cultural aspect to this phenomenon as well. As noted in the
nuclear context, the self-affirmation effect suggests that a regulatory regime
designed to provide "something for everyone" can garner support from a
surprising coalition of people. Again, however, there is a problem. The
coalition that learned to support the first-tier regulation could well prove
unstable in the face of the second-tier risks. In this case, the proximate cause of
the change in majority view would not be a change in the nature of the risk
(differently dread) but a change in the form of the available policy approaches
186. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 7, at 4.
187. See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 65 Fed. Reg.
30,680, 30,681-82 (May 12, 2000) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 552, 571, 585, 595) (describing




(command-and-control regulation, say, rather than market incentives).
Regardless of the mechanism, though, the end result is the same. Regulators
who design a first-tier regulatory regime to attract the support of a diverse
majority of voters could find themselves confronting equally or more hazardous
second-tier risks without the benefit of that public support.
Path dependence of this kind is ubiquitous. In 1966, for example, Alfred
E. Kahn suggested the following hypothetical. Suppose, in 1880, "some being
from outer space" had proposed a new "means of transportation that could...
permit you to travel about, alone or in small groups, at 60 to 80 miles an hour"
at a price of 40,000 lives per year. 189 In Kahn's view, we would have found
this proposal profoundly unappealing. 190 Yet we "reached the same result
gradually, unwittingly."'19 1 Each car purchase made the next one cheaper,
easier, more appealing, and eventually more necessary, as people relied on the
ubiquity of cars in making decisions about where to work and to live. At few
points along this trajectory did we look back to ask whether society, as a whole,
was moving in a useful direction.
Kahn does not discuss this problem in terms of risk perception, but it can
be recast in that light. The first-tier risks of the automobile were relatively
certain and controllable-not particularly dread, raising few cultural red flags.
Each individual could choose whether to drive a car, few people recognized the
pollution costs, 192 and accidents were fewer and less catastrophic. In short,
there were few fear-triggers, so people could support development of the
industry. With each generation of the automobile age, however, the risks
shifted subtly, until now we find ourselves confronted by automobiles that
exact enormous public health tolls and, worse, exacerbate oil dependence, local
and regional pollution, and atmospheric carbon loading.
These second-tier automobile risks are different in kind, both from the
first-tier risks and from each other. We may not fear cars' immediate public
health hazards as much as they warrant, but we do fear them. We call to mind
injured friends and relatives and see news reports of multi-car pileups, and our
resulting fear leads us to support some level of costly regulation to address
these risks (traffic signals, speed limits, side impact bars, seat belts). As a
society, we are somewhat more agnostic about local and regional air pollution,
which has less obviously catastrophic effects-we fear it enough to support
better catalytic converters, but not enough to support regulations that would
reduce miles traveled (carpooling requirements, walking streets and intercept
parking, dollars to public transportation rather than road construction). And we
189. Alfred E. Kahn, The Tyranny of Small Decisions: Market Failures, Imperfections, and the
Limits of Economics, 19 KYKLos: INT'L REV. SOC. SCI. 29-30 (1966).
190. Id at 30.
191. Id.
192. Indeed, cars solved the local pollution problem of horse manure on city streets. Stephen J.
Dubner & Steven D. Levitt, Freakonomics: Dog-Waste Management, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, § 6 at
32.
[Vol. 35:31
THE PERILS OF A HALF-BUILT BRIDGE
are so complacent about the risks of climate change that we ask, in all
seriousness, whether carbon dioxide from cars and other sources should be
considered an air pollutant. 193 Overall, then, society's differing attitudes toward
the different layers of automobile risks have produced a largely incoherent
regulatory regime that does next to nothing to protect us from some of the most
significant automobile hazards.
The automobile example hinges on the triggering of different perceptual
biases at different steps along the regulatory chain, but examples of the related
problem of coalition instability abound as well. For instance, different cultural
attitudes toward drug use (widely derogated) and urban blight (of greater
concern to egalitarians and solidarists than to others) have left us with a
national drug policy that cracks down on users and dealers without addressing
any of the social ills created by a policy of imprisonment. 194 Very similar
dynamics led to the deinstitutionalization of many mentally and physically
handicapped individuals, and the subsequent failure to construct the residential
group homes that were supposed to replace large institutions. 19 5 Analogously,
the coalitions that champion state abortion restrictions sometimes break down
when they are asked to support second-tier reforms like improved counseling
for pregnant women, streamlined adoption procedures, and social and
economic support networks for single mothers. 19 6 And similar coalition
instability helps to explain why political parties that must pander to multiple
interest groups to win elections subsequently have difficulty governing. 197
In short, multilayered regulatory dilemmas are common, and local
"regulatory minima"-undesirable policy dead ends from which policymakers
193. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
194. See Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILLANOVA L. REV. 753, 796 (2002) ("[T]he brunt of
[drug-war] violence is shouldered by those who are least able to bear the costs: poor, largely urban and
minority communities.... With the flight of human and financial capital away from urban blight, these
communities are left totally devastated by the drug war.").
195. Kevin J. Zanner, Dispersion Requirements for the Siting of Group Homes: Reconciling New
York's Padavan Law with the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 44 BUFFALO L. REV. 249, 249
(1996) (noting that "[m]unicipalities and siting agencies have struggled to integrate these individuals
into residential communities, often encountering the familiar cry of 'not in my backyard').
196. See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Women's Rights under Siege, 73 N.D. L. REV. 207, 228 (1997)
("[T]he 'Contract with the American Family,' and many members of Congress who support[ed] it,
[sought to deny] low-income women ... any funding for abortions, even if their pregnancies resulted
from rape or incest .... Ironically, though, under the welfare 'reform' proposals supported by some of
the very same organizations and individuals, many poor women are denied any funding for the babies to
whom they give birth."). But see Kahan & Braman, Cultural Cognition, supra note 14 at 168
(suggesting that in France, the affirmation effect resulted in the success of some first- and second-tier
efforts to address unwanted pregnancies).
197. See, e.g., Ryan Sager, Purple Mountains: Could the interior West-long seen as an archetypal
red region-be turning blue? The fate of the Republican Party may hinge on the answer, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July-August 2006, at 37, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200607/purple-west
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cannot emerge because the political dynamics changed unexpectedly between
the first and second tiers of the regulatory effort-are ubiquitous. The problem
has particular import in the risk context, though, because risk perception
theorists are actively trying to use behavioral psychology insights to sway
public opinion. In this context, it is especially important to consider the
consequences of any such education strategy. Failure to do so could produce an
entrenched and irrational regulatory policy that addresses first-tier risks but
leaves us threatened by equally or more serious second-tier risks that defy
regulatory solution.
CONCLUSION
Public risk perceptions could play an important role in the eventual
resolution of the debate about whether to build hundreds or thousands of new
nuclear power plants in response to climate change. The public's antipathy for
all things nuclear could defeat any effort either (1) to persuade former
opponents to support growth of the nuclear sector, or (2) to build a coalition of
odd bedfellows willing-each for their own reasons, and some reluctantly-to
agree to that growth. Alternatively, such an effort could have mixed results,
increasing public support for a first round of market-based regulatory changes
to facilitate sector growth (for example, tax credits and liability guarantees), but
failing to shift opinion about the command-and-control regulations necessary to
address second-tier risks, including those associated with radioactive waste
transport, processing, and storage. The latter scenario would deposit us at the
closed end of a regulatory blind alley, unable to revoke new power plant
licenses, but also unable satisfactorily to address their collateral safety and
public health risks.
This last unexpected and unfortunate outcome results from a little-
discussed attribute of the regulatory process: regulating risk is a tiered exercise.
Often, an unintended consequence of the first set of regulatory changes is the
exposure or augmentation of new risks that require their own rqund of
regulatory solution. The likelihood that policymakers will be successful in
addressing each of these new risks hinges, in part, on public support for a
regulatory solution. And such public support depends on the nature of the risk
(is it particularly dread?) and on the nature of the required solution (appropriate
for a market-based approach or better suited to command-and-control
regulation?).
This wedding cake or onion peel view of risk and regulation has important
implications for those who would use behavioral psychology insights to shift
public opinion about existing risks. In brief, watch what you wish for. That
such an approach could fail altogether turns out to be the good news. Far worse
is partial success, which can build support for first-tier regulatory reforms that
expose or augment equally or more serious second-tier risks less amenable to
regulatory solutions.
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